

**“Strategic Shift in Northeast Asia:
Future Policies and Strategies”**

December 29, 2020

WELCOMING REMARKS

PARK In-kook

Welcome to all of you joining us online from Korea and the US as well. First, I would like to thank President John Hamre for bringing together world-renowned experts. With the upcoming inauguration of the Biden administration, the US will likely revitalize a more traditional bottom-up approach to foreign policy. Against this backdrop, I hope that our in-depth and interactive discussions today and further debates will help shape the Biden administration’s policy towards Northeast Asia, especially the denuclearization of North Korea and ROK-US alliance. In this vein, I highly appreciate that CSIS has proposed to launch this joint Commission to form a collective intelligence and wisdom for the future of this region. I can’t overemphasize the importance of the foresight to look into the next 25 years’ geopolitical landscape on the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asia.

As opening the session, I’d like to suggest three pillars of geopolitical dynamics in Northeast Asia to center our discussions on. First, the future of US-China relations under the new Biden administration. Second, prospects for the North Korean denuclearization and nuclear proliferation beyond Korean Peninsula. And third, the future of multilateralism in terms of the provision of global public goods

As to the US-China relations, it is a general observation that Biden’s China policy will not dramatically change from that of president Trump. Because ‘Tough on China’ has become a bipartisan rhetoric in Washington and not likely to fade out any time soon. But on the actual possibility of ‘decoupling’ between the two economies, we have seen various controversial arguments on whether the [full] decoupling is feasible or not. What’s more important is to keep this bilateral relation from repeating the disastrous history of extreme protectionism in early 1930s by falling into the so-called ‘Kindleberger Trap.’ As eloquently articulated by prof. Nye, this concept points to the miserable outcome of failing to provide global public goods by superpowers. In the early 1930s, the US replaced the UK as the hegemonic power, but the US then was not ready to provide global public goods. As a result, global system collapsed and the world fell into depression, genocide and even World War II. With this historic lesson in mind, our discourse on the future of US-China relations must focus on how to avoid this zero-sum situation and reaffirm the two powers’ role as a source of global public goods.

On the prospects for North Korean denuclearization, we must recognize that Trump administration has given high priority to the North Korean nuclear issue, which had been on the back burner since President Clinton's signing of the Agreed Framework with North Korea in 1994. North Korea's virtual abidance to the moratorium on nuclear and missile testing deserves our attention as an early harvest. Now we're faced with a question on how to sustain the North Korean issue as the top priority or a deal-break issue in the new Biden administration. North Korea will likely launch additional provocations if and when they feel they are not receiving enough attention from the new administration. In such case, what kinds of additional sanctions could be feasible? – That's our second question.

The other question is on the format of negotiation. As a candidate, Biden has mentioned that the US will work with various stakeholders including China, implying that he will pursue a multilateral approach to solve North Korean nuclear issues. We can think about returning to the four-party talks or the six-party talks, even though Pyongyang will have some reluctance towards six-party talks. But it should not be overlooked that North Korea has already committed to the denuclearization in 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Joint Statement of the six-party talks in 2005. We must consider it as a critical bottom line for future negotiations.

Lastly, on the future of multilateralism. The new Biden administration is expected to re-engage the US with multilateralism in a host of global issues like climate change, public health, nuclear non-proliferation, human rights, etc. Especially, Biden as a candidate wrote in his op-ed to a Korean media outlet in October that he will engage in a 'principled diplomacy' in dealing with the denuclearization of North Korea, implying he would put more weight on various aspects of North Korean issues including human rights.

Six years ago, Prof. Joseph Nye visited our Institute in Seoul to give a special lecture on "Is the American Century Over?". Today, I look forward to listening to his insight on how the geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia will unfold for the next quarter century. I also vividly remember Gen. Brooks' powerful speech at the 4th Security Summit at Harvard Belfer Center, and he was right to point out that North Korea's pursuit of nuclear capability will place our concerns into more precarious dimension – the possibility of nuclear chain reaction in Northeast Asia and beyond. I'd also like to highlight that the Commission will produce an outcome document sometime in the early next year upon consecutive consultations between Chey Institute and CSIS. This report, either published jointly or separately, will reflect core elements on what will be converged during further discussions. Thank you and I will stop here.

Victor CHA

Let me just say that from our perspective of CSIS, we are quite excited to undertake this project with Chey Institute. It comes at a very important and critical time in terms of US policy and South Korean policy both on the Peninsula and in Asia for the change in the administration here in the United States. And in South Korea, government is in the last couple of years of

office. So, we look forward to having healthy exchange between two sides over the course of a few weeks, talking mainly on the topics that Amb. Park mentioned – and that is, the future of US-China relations and its impact on the Korean Peninsula; the future of multilateralism, and US alliances and partnerships around the world, including Asia; and of course, North Korea. So, we're very much looking forward to the discussion this morning/this evening.

PRESENTATIONS/Q&As

Joseph NYE

It's a pleasure to be with CSIS and with Chey Institute. I'm going to touch upon three pillars that Ambassador Park mentioned. The US-China relationship, North Korea and the future for multilateral/alliance relations.

On the US-China relationship, I think it's proper to say that it's in its worst condition that it's been in 50 years. And many people in Washington are talking about a new Cold War. I think that language, though, is very misleading. Because unlikely is real cold war where we had no trade or social contact with the Soviet Union. We have high degrees of interdependence with China, and the interdependence is not just economic and social. It's also ecological. There are things that are happening in the world, globally, transnationally, where we can't solve the problems acting alone. And China can't solve the problem acting alone. If I think about the current pandemic, it's a good example. But I'd also note that climate change is similar. And these are areas where, essentially, we can't think only about power over other countries. You also have to think about power with other countries.

And that's why I've called the relationship between the US and China, a cooperative rivalry. It really is much more complex than the situation we had with the SU in the real Cold War. Now, the Biden administration will make a difference in the US-China relationship. Primarily in terms of the style and predictability. I don't think it's going to have the back and forth, up and down type of volatilities that we saw during the Trump administration. But some of the issues that Trump raised are going to continue to be difficult and tough issues for Biden. For example, I don't see Biden allowing Huawei to build 5G telecommunication in the U.S., and I don't think we should. I think it is a security threat.

Similarly, on issues like freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, where the Hague Tribunal has found China wrong, I think we will continue our freedom of navigation operations and should do so. Now, what are the implications of all these for South Korea? And what does it mean?

I said before that South Korea is in some ways a victim of geography. A wonderful success story, but it's stuck down in a peninsula between giant neighbors – China to the North, Japan to the South, and Russia to the Northeast. In those circumstances, the proper security strategy for South Korea is the one that follows: to borrow power from a distant power which has no territorial interest or aspiration to balance the local power to protect your own independence. And that's the importance of the US-Korean alliance, which allows Korea to have that degree of independence.

We saw the Chinese reaction to the deployment of THAAD. China loves to see this alliance go away and tried to bully South Korea to make it behave better.

But basically, this is the right proposal as a security strategy for South Korea. And fortunately, that is very close to what the Biden administration is thinking. Biden has talked about the

importance of alliances and multilateralism. So, in that sense, I think you are going to find the chosen defense and security strategy for South Korea is one that's going to match more closely with the new Biden administration than it did with the outgoing Trump administration.

That still leaves major problems. For example, what to do about North Korea? basically, we are going to have to try to recruit China to put more pressure on NK. We still have the objective – denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But in the meantime, we have to strengthen deterrence to prevent the NK throwing its way around. And we have to see if we can reach interim agreements which can restrain and restrict some of North Korea's bad behavior. In that sense, I think we are in a situation where the relationship between the US and China is complex but also has very strong effect on South Korea. And that's what requires us to work more closely between Seoul and Washington to make sure that we are working on the same page to get this done, to have a common position.

The background of all these is the importance of this relationship in this cooperative rivalry. And that's going to require much more attention to crisis prevention as well as management techniques. What does that add up to the situation where the US, I think, is both able and willing to provide those global public goods, that Amb. Park referred to? We have the capability. And I think what we are going to see in public attitudes as measured by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, is the interest in 70% of American people of having an outward oriented cooperative foreign policy. And that's been very much the attitude of the incoming Biden Administration. So, I think the prospects for being able to deal together between Seoul and Washington with the problems we face regarding Pyongyang and relations with Beijing are good. The question now is to make sure we keep South Korea and the US in a close alliance which makes them able to deal with these problems. Thank you very much.

→ **SOHN Jie-ae:** First of all, I'd like to take you back to what President Park talked about in terms of 'Kindleberger Trap.' It's sort of what happens when there are global power shifts that are going on, especially these days between US and China. The question he asks, which I want to ask you as well, is how do we avoid this kind of void of not having a global power that provides global goods?

Joseph NYE: I think Mr. Park expressed it very well. The danger is that if the largest countries don't take the lead and provide the global public goods, nobody else will. And the fact that China is getting stronger means that in areas like climate change where China produces more greenhouse gases than the United States does, or most likely the world trading system where China has essentially tried to build the system with state-owned subsidies and companies with electric course of intellectual property transfer – we are going to have get a rules-based system where the Chinese and US work together along with other countries that create that system. So, the Kindleberger Trap, I think that we should worry about is that essentially if the US lets down its lead

and China doesn't pick up its responsibilities, we are all going to be the worse off.

- **SOHN Jie-ae:** But as you point out, you know in the past four years during the Trump administration, there has been a sort of stepping back from the United States in terms of the global leadership and the provision of global public goods. And China has actually done its best to sort of try to fill the gap. And as you point out, with the Biden administration, they will be coming back in terms of trying to put together more outreached, outward policies. Do you see a sort of competition for hegemony between the US and China, and especially in this part of the world?

Joseph NYE: Yes, very definitely. There is great power rivalry and we can't ignore it. That's why it's important, as I mentioned earlier, to stand up to China on areas where it's taking positions that are clearly wrong as in freedom of navigation situation in the South China Sea. So, we have to realize that in this cooperative rivalry that I mentioned, you can't ignore the rivalry part of it. But the hard job is to make sure that we don't let the focus on the rivalry prevent us from engaging in the cooperation. That's not always easy. It means doing two things which are quite different simultaneously. But I think we have the capacity to do it and I think that's the right way to frame it as a cooperative rivalry where we have to combine power over others as well as power with others. It can be done; it's not an easy task.

- **SOHN Jie-ae:** You address South Korea – the position, sometimes difficult positions of countries like Korea that are sort of stuck in the middle. How does Korea try to navigate this kind of international position in which even though what you call is a cooperative rivalry, South Korea is put in a position of having to choose one side over the other in many instances?

Joseph NYE: South Korea has an admirable record. I mean, its economic growth and its real democracy where governments actually change as a result of elections. It sets a model, an example for much of the rest of the world. It gives South Korea a great deal of soft power. In addition to that, South Korea has to maintain its hard power, which is to make itself strong enough that it doesn't tempt aggression from the North either – North of the 38th Parallel or further doors. So, in that sense, South Korea has to be able to stand up to China, stand up to Pyongyang, and at the same time, if the Americans make unreasonable demands, it has to stand up to the Americans. So, I think South Korea has the capacity to do that. But I also think that the values and security interests of South Korea and the US are closely enough aligned that while there'll be differences from time to time, I don't see any fundamental ruptures because of the long-run security interests in both countries.

→ **SOHN Jie-ae:** You raised the issue of soft power. There has always been talk about the limitations of China becoming a global leader and one of the things that has been cited is its lack of soft power. Do you think that in the past years, China has been able to gain in this area? I mean, is China bigger soft power than it used to be?

Joseph NYE: No, I don't think so. I think they've certainly been trying. They have been investing billions and billions of dollars to try to become better at soft power. But they have two fundamental problems. One is, when you have territorial disputes with your neighbors, it's hard to be attractive, which is what soft power is about. You can't kill Indian soldiers on the border and set up a Confucius institute in New Delhi at the same time and expect to be attractive. The other major problem that China has with soft power is its insistence on tight party control on all activities. A great deal of a country's soft power comes from its civil society. In the US, from universities, from foundations, from Hollywood and so forth. In Korea, from KPOP, as well as the impressive democratic record I mentioned. China – when you get somebody in civil society who is really a genius like Au Weiwei, what do they do? They put them in jail or put them in exile. There're limits on what China can do with soft power and I think that shows when you look at some of these indices of soft power such as the Soft Power 30, which is constructed by Portland and London, which shows China down around 27th or 28th of the 30 top countries.

LEE Hong-koo

I think there are two words or main themes which have influenced over the past 100 years our part of the world. The first word is imperialism. I have said on several occasions last ten years about imperialism of today. After the financial crisis of 2008 in Seoul, somewhat concerned about the revival of imperialism. Because in later part of 20th century and the early part of the 21st century, we had tremendous trend of globalization and for example under the leadership of two secretaries general, Kofi Anan and Ban Ki-moon, the UN took a strong leadership in bringing almost universal economic development, which was remarkable. But coming into the century, everybody was not satisfied because in spite of all the positive developments, you can see continued inequality nationally and internationally. Nationally between the rich and the poor in the country, and internationally between the rich countries and poor countries. So, there was tremendous unhappiness. And I said I don't know if this makes sense or not, one big problem in this kinds of situation, we saw in the last 10 years or so, revival of nationalism in major power, big powers. Earlier, after the second world war, former victims of colonialism were the main force for nationalism to bring independence and so on. But I think in recent years, major powers were really the big actors in revival of nationalism, singled out the US and China. Both of them were suffering from what I call a 'nostalgia for empire.' In case of the US, looking back good old days of 1950s, 1960s and so on, those were the years much better than what you have now in the US. At least that's what many people seem to feel. In fact, the election

of President Trump signified the revival of nationalism, but more importantly, revival of nostalgia for empire. Let's have the US of old days revived.

Likewise, in China with Xi Jinping's concerted effort to revitalize or revive the Chinese nationalism, that is Chinese empire. Every Chinese look like they have some nostalgia for empire. So, this explains the situation. And the Chinese-American contest along that time – Prof. Nye already explained. A couple of years ago, I attended a meeting in Beijing with some of the former leaders and we invited the last mayor – you may say administrator – of Hong Kong before it was transferred to China from the US, Mr. Tung Chee-hwa. So, we all asked what does he think about these problems or questions and here is what Tung Chee-hwa said; you don't have to worry too much about this Chinese-American rivalry because from Tung Chee-hwa's point of view, both Americans and Chinese are basically commercial people and these commercial people don't really go into fights. They always find some solutions, which will may not be always equally but more or less fairly divide the benefits of compromise. So, there may be some dangers but nevertheless he's rather optimistic about the future of the US-China relations – what I just wanted to put into the conversation.

Now, the revival of major power nationalism or nostalgia for empire – we have to think about Russia. Not many visits, but several visits I had going to Russia, I asked some of the people – not really officials or others, and the impression I received was they all like the current leader because again, they thought Mr. Gorbachev had given away the status of empire from the Soviet Union in the global politics. In some sense, the current leader had restored it and what I am saying is this satisfied the Russian people's yearning for the...nostalgia for empire. But this kind of situation – now I mentioned Russia because with the election of President-elect Biden, I think Russia is coming back recent weeks because the Russian hacking of various agencies in the US has become a major issue. But also relatedly, Putin has sent his message of congratulations to Biden and he specifically said we could cooperate and could engage in constructing conversations. This, I think, signals what I call maybe a new trend, that is a return of major power engagement in resolving some of the many strategic problems. When we say many strategic problems, we certainly have to include the Korean Peninsula. So, what I am hoping – and not only myself, but *New York Times*, I think three days ago, in a very long article about the Russian attempt to force certain things from the US. For example, maybe there will be a new start talk strategic arms limitation talk between the US and Soviet Union and some of the early days of the 1960s and 70s when the US and then Soviet Union cooperated to bring some of the strategic resolution about strategic problems between those two major powers. So, it's the coming back of this type of geopolitical consideration and geopolitical strategic condition.

I'm hoping that when we talk about the North Korean nuclear problem, we were too much concentrating on China but we really haven't paid that much attention to Russian influence on North Korea. So, I'm hoping that Biden put in traditional or at least goes back to decades...the efforts of the USA and Russia to end the cold war and bring a new age to the world and somehow they have to revive this and in resolving these problems, you can talk about the North

Korean nuclear problem. It's not a local problem because after all, both Russia and China are one of the five members of the so-called P5 at the UN. The P5, the major powers, have a responsibility to maintain peace in the world and to support major decisions of the UN toward that end, which means among other things, those five countries have major responsibility to uphold the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. That's the problem Chinese had more or less ignored, but I think to pressure or to persuade the Chinese, we need US-Russia cooperation and kind of new major power relations to change the general atmosphere.

Now, having said all this – in some sense, this is what I had said last time. Maybe we are bringing back somewhat old notion of geopolitics. Prof. Nye has already mentioned the fact that whenever you talk about geopolitics, Korea is a prime example of how you handle your problems as well as your neighbor's problems through a proper understanding of geopolitical setting and the problems they are in. With this new hope for a new relationship between the US and Russia under the Biden administration, we may be able to change overall structure of major power involvement in these problems. That's my hope.

Finally, I said imperialism was one of my main concerns, but going back to the 19th century, Korea had become a victim of neighbors' colonial or imperial attempt – Japan, China, and others. Our first president, Dr. Syngman Rhee, was only about 29 or 30 years old – was sent to Washington as King Gojong's special emissary to persuade the US to do something about this. I think this was 1905. He was able to meet President Theodore Roosevelt, but he didn't succeed. First of all, the reason he was able to have that audience or that meeting was because so many American missionaries who as a group played such a decisive role in Korean history had sent so many letters to Washington, the White House. He was able to have that meeting, but his appeal didn't get a positive response because just before he arrived, there was a so-called Japan-US secret agreement about how to deal with the Philippines and the Korean Peninsula problem. That's of course now just a page in the diplomatic history, but it was a very disappointing situation. But that was the 19th century. Come to the 20th century, the US played decisive leadership role in both WWI and WWII. As a result of all this, Korea was liberated and furthermore, only five years after the WWII, the Korean War broke out. Korean War broke out largely because – I still feel that – the ignorance on the part of Kim Il-sung, Stalin and maybe a little bit Mao Zedong about the US. They all didn't think that the US will intervene with their military immediately when that war broke out and that ignorance had caused the great deal of sacrifices to all parties. Now 70 years have passed, but what I'm afraid is there are still quite bit of ignorance on the part of these countries about the US. I'm glad that this election of 2020 has somewhat re-established the proper image of the US and I hope everybody including countries I just mentioned will understand this and will bring a new era in diplomacy and in the major power politics.

John HAMRE

Thank you very much for inviting me, and let me say how grateful I am to the Chey Institute and to ambassador Park for their leadership. This is really an important initiative and I am grateful that they have taken the lead to do that and invited us to a part of it. And my special thanks to Joe Nye and Vincent Brooks for joining us tonight and of course Victor Cha who is the real expert at CSIS on Korea. I was asked to address three questions tonight or this morning. First was what do the elections say about America and American democracy. The second question is about my view on the nomination of Lloyd Austin to be the next Secretary of Defense. The third question is what do I think will be the Biden administration's approach to our competition with China. So, I'll be brief on each of these because I am more interested in your questions.

First, Biden won a decisive victory. There is no question about that. There were over 6 million more Americans that voted for Biden than those who voted for Trump. President Trump is waging a very strange campaign to undo the election. In recent days it has had some peculiar dimensions, even suggesting the military ought to organize new elections in States that Trump lost. This is very strange and undemocratic honestly. But I think if you step back and look at these bizarre 30 days, the American judicial system and political leaders at the State and local level have stood very strong for the integrity of the election. Over 80 judges have ruled against Trump's lawyers that argued that there were problems with the elections. Over 80 justices, and over half of them were appointed by Trump. So, the judicial system stood very strong and honest. And if you look at the statements made by the Republican governors and election officials, they all stood by the legitimacy and honesty of their elections. So, despite president Trump's very odd campaign, it's sort of like someone in the sixth grade who doesn't win the class presidency and claims it is a fraud election just because he doesn't win. All the facts show that it was an honest and fair election. And broadly speaking, the American public understands that and accepts that. So, I don't think that there is a fundamental question about the integrity of our democracy. I do think there will be a question about our resolve of our nation when we are so divided. When you do look at the actions especially of the Republican senate during the last year, they've rejected a lot of president Trump's initiatives in the Middle East, pulling troops out of Afghanistan, pulling troops out of Korea. They've rejected Trump, but we are still a divided country about America's future directions, and I think this is where president Biden will be a very traditional intellect. He embraces the main trajectory of America's foreign policy, that America should be an active participant in the international system and a leader where it can lead. But he is going to be challenged and we will see how it will unfold. I personally suspect that he will be successful in foreign policy. I think our domestic policy will be rancorous and very difficult. But I think our foreign policy is going to be solid. And I think that president-elect Biden is going to do well.

Now very briefly on retired General Lloyd Austin. I don't know him honestly, and Vincent Brooks does so he be in a better position to address this. I don't know him but I do know his reputation. He is considered to be a very solid, fine officer, with a great deal of personal moral

courage and direction. He is not an outspoken individual about policy directions. He didn't do that when he was in senior positions in government. What I think that means is that we are likely to see a team effort with the Biden administration. I don't think we will see big public disputes between the Defense Department and the State department. I think we are going to see a real team effort on the part of everybody to work collaboratively and in an integrated way. I don't think we will see radical changes in the trajectory of foreign policy, especially in Asia. I think you will find a very solid embrace of the traditional framework that we've had in place in Asia for many years. I think it is a question how they are going to address North Korea, but I don't believe we are going to see any radical departures for foreign policy, especially in Asia.

Finally, just a word about Biden's approach to China. This is the greatest question to wrestle with. I should put this in context. Back in 2011 and 2012, when president Obama basically gave his famous speech of pivot to Asia, there was some criticism at the time, did we really pivot, did we really move much etc. But that was a historic declaration because it was the first time in 300 years of American history when we said that Asia was our first priority, not Europe. It is really hard to overstate that, it is a significant development, and I believe that represents a consensus today. I think the foreign policy and defense community still view Asia as the premiere security question that America is facing, and that will be our first priority. I also think that the Biden administration will embrace the direction that came out of the national strategy review that Jim Mattis conducted when he was Secretary of Defense, which basically shifted our defense planning away from counterterrorism back towards peer competition with great powers. That I believe will also be the case. I think you'll see that being continuity. So, I think you'll see a fair amount of continuity in America's overall direction. Asia will be our highest priority and peer-to-peer competition is going to be the primary focus, not issues on counterterrorism, Now I do think the Biden administration is going to work hard to find areas of collaboration with China where they can. I think most people feel that is a limited set of topics, but they're going to try to find them. And they're going to work to try to find constructive things we can do with China. At the same time, I believe they're going to be more outspoken about the human rights issues and democracy issues that China presents the world. And early on, president-elect Biden has talked about having a summit of democracies. I think that is going to have a very significant theme of the Biden administration and it will certainly have tones that Beijing will resent. I think that will a challenge for us to manage. But do I think that we're on a collision course with China? I don't think so. I think both countries know that there is great peril in letting things go out of control, and I think it will be important for both of us to try and find ways to manage it. But I do think you are going to find a very steady hand, and you're going to find a hand in president-elect Biden that values allies very strongly. Let me stop with that.

- ➔ **SOHN Jie-ae:** Thank you Dr. Hamre. I find it very interesting that you talked about the US trying to find a balance between collaboration and rivalry with China and its future emphasis on Asia. Now you talked about the fact that in terms of focusing on

Asia and the emphasis on democracy will call upon the US's two greatest democratic allies in Asia which are Japan and South Korea. And there is a lot of talk about the increased need for trilateral cooperation between Washington Tokyo and Seoul. But as you know, relations between Seoul and Tokyo are really at a very low point. And in the past, the US has played a role to improve relations between Seoul and Tokyo. And actually, another nominee the Secretary of State Mr. Blinken who I believe you know better than the Defense Secretary because he was also related to CSIS, he's known to have played a role in terms of getting South Korea and Japan back to a sort of a semi-normal state. Do you believe that in the future he will go back in playing that role or do you think the US will try to play that role in some way?

John HAMRE: I think it's widely felt here in foreign policy and defense circles that each one of us, Japan, South Korean, and the US, is weakened if there are division within us. I think there is a view that our overall collective interests and our individual interests are much strengthened if we work together. I think that is a very profoundly shared view here. So, yes. I do think there will be an effort to try to bridge across these great divides, and there is a great divide. I understand it very well. America is not a country that has a strong historical identity. I mean everyone who came to America left someplace else. We don't really have a strong sense of history shaping our own identity. But I do understand how important that is in Korea and in Japan. And these sentiments are deep and they're very real. But if we say "does relitigating the past help us with our collective future?" I think it is better for us to focus on improving our collective future.

YOON Young-kwan

I'd like to express my gratitude to Dr. John Hamre of CSIS and Amb. Park In-Kook of Chey Institute for organizing this very timely and important conference and inviting me. As we know, intensifying US-China competition has put many countries in the world into difficult situations. And I think South Korea is a country which has been most negatively affected. Korea is a divided country, and South Korea has a very hostile neighbor – North Korea. And South Korea is located very close to China and dependent on that country economically.

However, the nature of South Korea-US relationship is qualitatively different from any other bilateral relationships that South Korea has. In the sense that ROK-US relationship is that of alliance. Having said that, I would like to make a few policy recommendations to both governments at the US and South Korea.

First, I'd like to suggest to both governments to establish a special bilateral commission composed of high-level officials as well as experts to discuss the future of bilateral alliance. You may call it the Commission for the future of US-ROK alliance. As we know, our alliance was created 67 years ago and we are living in a totally different world nowadays. By updating

our alliance, I think we can reduce the possibilities of some misunderstanding and miscommunication between two allies. Now I have a few recommendations for our government. Many Koreans feel relieved to watch president-elect Biden putting emphasis on the value of alliance in recent months. Actually, two most important key words, I think, of the Biden administration seem to be democracy and alliance. For example, and the identity of South Korea as a state is based on such values as democracy, freedom, and multilateralism, open market, etc. I wish South Korean government to work closely with the Biden administration in this field of value diplomacy – promoting democracy in other parts of the world as well. For example, it would be a good start for the South Korean government to actively participate in the summit of democracies that president-elect Biden is planning to hold in near future.

In this context of value diplomacy, I also hope South Korea-Japan relationship would improve. Japan is another ally of the US and that country is also democracy. So, it is natural for us to try to improve the relationship in the future. And power shift from Mr. Abe to PM Suga has provided an important opportunity to turn bilateral relationship into a positive one.

Another area where South Korea can work closely with the US is global diplomacy focusing on overcoming some global challenges. For example, South Korea could accumulate some experience and expertise in overcoming such global issues like poverty, pandemics or climate change. So, South Korea may work closely with the US in dealing with these problems, for example, in Indo-Pacific or in other parts of the world. Also, South Korea may work together with the US in the field of high-tech areas, too.

I have a few suggestions to the US government, too. I hope the US policy makers pay more attention to South Korea's unique geopolitical dilemma. Prof. Nye already mentioned that South Korea, or Korea as a whole, has been suffering the tyranny of Geography. Historically, whenever there were military conflicts on the Korean Peninsula between the maritime power and continental power, Koreans suffered national catastrophes. And most Koreans nowadays do not want to repeat it again. In short, Korea is not like Japan or Australia. Those countries are not peninsula countries, surrounded by big powers. They don't have North Japan or North Australia. So, I think customized alliance towards South Korea will work more effectively for the US than one-size-fits-all strategy.

Many observers acknowledge that Korea is probably the most region in the world. DMZ is just 35 miles away from Seoul. Seoul is within the range of several thousands artillery attacks from North Korea. North Korea's nuclear program is a direct threat to South Korea. So South Koreans do not have much room to pay attention to security matters in other regions. This is why Koreans think that establishing a permanent peace structure in Korea is the most important and urgent matter. In other words, without having a substantive improvement in South-North relations and the stable Korean Peninsula situation, South Koreans would feel uncomfortable to be deeply engaged in other regional conflicts.

In my view, this is not a matter of whether there is progressive government or conservative one in South Korea. The more actively the US cooperates with South Korea on resolving North

Korea issue, the easier for South Korea to cooperate with the US on other regional issues. For example, Biden administration may be preoccupied with urgent domestic issue in next year. And it may not have much political capital to invest to resolve North Korean nuclear issue. In that case, I think it would be very prudent if the US government could send a message to the North Korea quietly or publicly. For example, a message saying that the US would recognize the Singapore agreement two years ago and it's serious about resuming negotiation on the nuclear issues soon. I think that will have North Korea, for the time being, not provoke, not make any provocations for some time.

I think it is important for both countries, South Korea and the US, to cooperate on the nuclear issues too. And many observers have arrived to the conclusion that the maximalist approach on the nuclear issue could not work. If the US government takes a more pragmatic, step by step approach, there would be more hope for the successful diplomatic solution for North Korean nuclear issue.

Pressure is certainly important, but that alone cannot work, I think. Without some formal political engagement of North Korea, negotiated solution would be difficult because of very low level of mutual trust between the US and North Korea and North Korea's deep sense of insecurity. Let me stop there.

Vincent BROOKS

Thank you, Jie-ae and I hope everyone can hear me well. First, good morning and good evening to all of you ladies and gentlemen, who are present and who are watching. I am honored to be part of this panel and part of this commission. All of the members of the panel I know, both US and Korean, and I have great admiration and respect for each of you and I am grateful to be on this panel with you to share some thoughts. So, let me just try to add a few thoughts here and in the interest of time I will try to hit three main points and out of necessity, I will try to not explore them in great detail but certainly I can go more broadly on matters that you want to dive into Jie-ae when we get into questions and answers. That includes going shallowly into the military aspects. I'm going to speak a bit more broadly than that but can always into deep dive if you want to.

So, point number one, my view is that progress on the Korean peninsula must extend from progress in strengthening the Korea and US alliance. It has to begin from the Korea US relationship. And has been said, there are some residual points of friction that resulted from a transactional approach to alliance relations and these have to give way to reconciling within the first 6 months of 2021. I put that timeline on there because I believe that is a very important window of opportunity. It reflects the first 6 months, the opening of the first year of the Biden administration and it reflects the opening of the final year of the Moon Jae-in administration. And there 's not time to waste. If there is going to be alignment it should happen quickly, and get some of these aligned alliance friction points out of the way. There is one example of a matter that awaits reconciliation, and there are several but I'll call out specifically the special

measures agreement. In my opinion, this must be concluded and renewed soon and certainly within those first 6 months. And it's my advice that the SMA traditionally a 5-year agreement, now operating under a 1-year agreement that has expired, my advice is that it is renewed for a 3-year period this time. That will free it from some of the gravitational pull of being timed for the next renewal afterward during a period of national electoral politics in either one of the countries. The 3 years should be followed by 5 years and that will reset the renewal clock and it will insulate this important agreement from partisanship and nationalism that in my opinion skewed the agreement into its current impasse. So, this is work that must be undertaken quickly and effectively.

Point number two, the approach to North Korea. This is aligned with what Minister Yoon Young-kwan said and my view is that the approach to North Korea must continue to include pressure through sanctions and also international alignment. But it must also be in my view better balanced with an active approach to constructive engagement with North Korea. Now there will be room for debate whether this will be a bottom-up approach or a top-down approach and I would submit to you that it will have to include at its heart, a top-down approach. This is because of the limited degrees of trust that Kim Jong-un has for anyone in his surrounding circle. A bottom-up approach will not be reflective of Kim Jong-un. So as a result, I think there will have to be some readiness to engage at the most senior levels very early, but a continuous engagement that allows then some fidelity to be built in the relationship from lower levels as time goes on. This may require therefore a hybrid approach. Now within this engagement effort, I think that there should be a serious discussion about establishing a new relationship between North Korea and the two allies: US and South Korea. This is new from the viewpoint of North Korea, which should see it as a step away from hostility and I think this is one of the matters that must be concluded pretty early. Through engagement.

The US and South Korea have to articulate the broad range of concerns that each country has for North Korea. And there are many concerns: human rights, missing persons, etc. There are many concerns. But having laid those out upfront, my advice is that the alliance should not try to work on them concurrently. They cannot run in parallel. And that's mostly because North Korea can't handle it. And so, recognizing who it is that will be across the table I think will be very important. Candidly, compartmenting issues is an approach that is well understood by North Korea. They do it all the time. So, they get it when something is compartmented. We're going to work only on North-South relations over here, we're going to work on nuclear issues over here, we're going to work on other issues separately. So, they have no problem with compartmenting, even after all the issues have been laid on the table. It's important to recognize that for North Korea a new relationship comes first, and then progress on more substantive matters will follow. And I believe that the US and South Korea have to be willing to take a degree of risk on this. This is not an approach that is comfortable or regular from the perspective especially from the US. But there's some risk that must be taken by following this sequence, and if so I think that can help to create some momentum and some lubrication in the relationship that'll keep it from locking itself up, as we've seen happen on too many occasions in the past.

And finally, on this point about the approach to North Korea, I think it must be viewed in the context of international relations with China. Often, we talk about the US-South Korean relationship in the context of relations with China, but I'm suggesting that the approach must also be viewed in the context of its relationship with China and obviously the alliance's relationship as well. It prompts in my mind a few questions. And these are food for thoughts for the administrations to grapple with. Can the US and South Korea create an alternative for North Korea in terms of its own economy and security? Can the relationship with North Korea reach the depth needed to truly determine the true meaning of North Korea's requested security guarantees? I think that North Korea is going to require some deep engagement in order to get to that level of clarity. And on the way there will be many things that seem to be issues of security guarantee but they're superficial. What is the real issue that North Korea is seeking. And that needs to be thought through in the context of their relationship with China. And can the US and South Korea as allies create essentially a new balance of power in Northeast Asia, of power and influence really, when compared to the North Korea-China relationship? China has had great influence over North Korea's economy for a very long time. Up to 90 percent of the economy is impacted or controlled by China. North Korea is a basket case. I don't think that is what North Korea is looking for as their future but how do we help North Korea move in a different direction that creates an alternative to that? And yet leads to the peace and stability on the peninsula.

Point number three, gets to the much broader regional considerations, many of which have been touched on already. The key point is that the Republic of Korea must become bigger than the peninsula. And that's not something that can wait much longer, that growth into being bigger than the peninsula using the throw weight that is out there, both soft power and hard power as Joe Nye said, I think it's important to begin to get a grip on this even now, and begin to set the strategic conditions for that. First as an ally of the US, South Korea definitely has a challenging dual task of maintaining a clear focus on changing the situation with North Korea. But it must also look to the near abroad in the Indo-pacific region where South Korea's actions and influence are greatly needed. South Korea has so much to offer. It's common for South Korea to highlight the softer things that can be offered and they're out there. South Korea is already engaged globally. But South Korea's strength in other areas must also be present. And that can come not so much in standing up against China that may be necessary at some point, but that doesn't have to be the start point but rather to support other allies of the US and other nations throughout the region. Running from Laos to Indonesia, each one of them, each country in the region has some security and as well as economic prosperity concerns, and South Korea has capacity to help in both of those areas. So, it is a direct engagement with countries in the region that I think is most important, not so much a standoff against China. I think that this will be done while South Korea is under some great pressure. There will be domestic pressure on how to approach this broader regional engagement and there will be international pressure, particularly from the US and also from China. But this further emergence of South Korea onto the world stage is in my opinion the opening of what will come after a changed Korean peninsula emerges. South Korea cannot afford to wait. It can't let the environment set without

having impacted it in South Korea's interest and relationships to the alliance. Of course, the US, as the ally of South Korea has to work carefully with South Korea. It must help South Korea engage the region without displaying impatience or more importantly a lack of empathy. I think this has been highlighted as well. There is great complexity that faces South Korea, and the US must understand that complexity from South Korea's eyes, as it helps South Korea engage the region.

So, as I close let me just say that I believe that the next 10 to 30 years of this century will reflect a permanent change to the existing international order. And I believe that change will endure well into the next century. So, as these dialogues are leading to a strategic approach to what our nations wish for the mid-century to look like, that must begin to emerge in the next 2 to 5 years, while there is still time to impact the direction.

JUNG Seung Jo

Thank you professor Sohn. And thank you for giving me the opportunity to participate in this excellent conference. And to be able to see my old friends, especially from the US, General Brooks, Dr. Victor Cha, Dr. Hamre, and also professor Nye.

My long-standing question since I was the deputy commander of Combined Forces Command is whether the ROK and US military alliance is working well or not. The official evaluation has always been okay. Ironclad. Strongest in the world. Stronger than ever. It is same even today. However, in private dialogues, we can see some concerns. Actually, the poll conducted by the Institute for Korean American Studies in April this year, shows 84% of respondents believe that the ROK-US alliance was not stronger than that of last year. We have some different thoughts about North Korean nuclear issue, wartime OPCON transfer, SMA, combined exercises, station of USFK, live fire exercises, UNC revitalization, and military cooperation between ROK, US and Japan etc. Sometimes we have questions whether both sides really have confidence as the real alliance. As we are to have a new administration in the US, I believe this is the right time to restore or normalize the alliance by confidence building through fulfillment of the responsibilities of alliance partners. The most important thing in this process is to share the same understanding to solve pending issues. Please understand my presentation today is my personal view focused on the military perspective.

First issue is North Korean nuclear threat. We cannot give up denuclearization of North Korea. Whether it is CVID, FFVD, it must be the perfect denuclearization. North Korea is accustomed to survive under certain level of insufficiency. We need to have cooperation from international community including China and Russia to ledge stronger sanctions that North Korea cannot withstand. In a military perspective however, we need to put more emphasis on extended deterrence. We need to have stronger deterrence capability, commitment, and posture. To enhance capability, we need to have more detailed and tailored extended deterrence plan hopefully to an affluent level. We need to periodically exercise by PTX, CPX, FTX. The ROK also needs to equip more reliable retaliation capability in conventional way. The alliance needs

to show more decisive commitment from working level to national command level with more ready posture of deployment capabilities and the shared nuclear decision-making process. We need to show our enhanced capability, commitment, and posture, not only to the alliance, but to North Korea.

Next is wartime OPCON transition. We already have very good agreement of condition-based transition principle to hold on. The important thing now is to evaluate the condition objectively. I propose to operate external evaluation team to ensure the objectiveness of the evaluation. The alliance is evaluating the IOC, FOC and FMC of future CFC. However, we must know that they are only part of overall evaluation.

Next issue is SMA. Some people of Korea were hurt when US side was reported to relate the amount of money to stationing of the USFK. It does not go with the spirit of the alliance and the spirit of SOFA. We need to agree that the alliance is mutually beneficial for both countries. However, when we see the split of SMA and ROK's enhanced economic capability, ROK needs to increase the amount to a rational level that both can accept. We also need to change the annual negotiation, as General Brooks already mentioned. I prefer 5-10-year negotiation and a 3-year negotiation that General Brooks mention will be a good start. It must not be a political issue especially in the presidential campaign.

Next is combined exercise. I have the experience to serve in Iraq as division commander under US lead national corp. I remember we could conduct mission without any crucial difficulties because my staff officers were trained in combined operation through frequent exercises like UFL, USG, Team Spirit or RSO&I. Combined training is essential for the readiness of the alliance. We need to resume the combined exercise. It is also closely related to ROK's military capability to lead combined operations, which is a very important condition for wartime OPCON transition. The combined exercise will also contribute to deter any North Korean provocation.

Next is training facility for USFK, especially live fire exercise. The lack of fire range influences the readiness of the USFK. Serving this problem is very important to give the stable stationing environment to the USFK. I know that the Defense Minister Suh Wook is working very hard to solve this problem. However, it is not an issue that can be solved by MND's effort alone. The president or prime minister must lead a trans-government effort, coordinating with national assembly to acquire the required facilities.

Next issue is military cooperation between the ROK, US and Japan. In a military perspective, the trilateral military cooperation is very important to counter the North Korean threat and to maintain the regional security. The military cooperation between ROK and Japan is essential in maintaining the ROK and US alliance. Although, ROK and Japan have some difficult issues, we need to cooperate with each other while arguing with each other at the same time. In this sense the GSOMIA between the two countries should not become a political issue.

Next issue is the revitalization of UNC. When the concept of UNC revitalization was known to ROK public, there was some misunderstanding that the UNC would function as another

combat command in Korea's theater of operation. As US side including General Brooks and General Abrams have tried hard to inform the facts, I believe many Korean now understand the truth. UNC's number one function is to maintain the armistice as the responsible entity to sign the agreement. In wartime UNC will function as the first provider when other countries send any military support through the UN. The people of both ROK and US need to share the fact that CFC will be the only one combatant command in KTO. We understand that the alliance is beneficial for both the ROK and US. Sometimes we take it for granted, however it is not right. We need to put some effort to maintain it. The most important fact here is the perception of the national leaders as well as the efforts to establish pro-alliance policies. The increased contact and candid dialogue between the government officials and military leaders will be important to strengthen the alliance. At the same time civilian side efforts will also be essential to promote the alliance. Let me introduce two organizations. In 2017, Korea Defense Veteran Association or KDVA now lead by Gen. Brooks was founded in US, whose members are former USFK, CFC, and KATUSA since the armistice agreement in 1953. Same time in Korea, we established the Korea US Alliance Foundation or KUSAF. The principle goals of both organizations are to strengthen the alliance. I expect these organizations perform very positive functions in an active manner.

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