

## WELCOMING REMARKS

### **PARK In-kook**

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is my great pleasure to welcome all of you to today's webinar entitled “The Quad and Korea.”

Given the long-standing political habits of undermining previous administration's political agenda, like ‘anything but Clinton’ or ‘anything but Obama,’ president Biden is unique in keeping some torches of Trump's policy alive and even further them. ‘Tough on China’ and the ‘revival of the Quad’ are notable examples.

As you might be aware, Quad has been making the most remarkable leap forward ever since its first pitch in 2007. Especially in the wake of president Biden's inauguration, the Quad seems to have been centered as a key component of the US strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.

Taking this opportunity, I'd like to draw your attention to four aspects of the Quad.

- First – Before 2017, Australia and India were lukewarm in their response to the Quad, which made it dormant for ten years. One noteworthy question is why and how these two countries decided to actively participate in the Quad.
- Second – the Quad started off as a strategic dialogue based on maritime security cooperation. Nowadays, we are seeing it move onto more comprehensive, compelling global agenda such as emerging technologies, climate change, vaccine distribution, and global supply chains.

In this sense, I'd like to invite your attention to the fact that president Biden signed an executive order last February to review the global supply chains used by four US key industries.

I think now is the best time to promo

te a joint initiative between the US and Korea to restructure global supply chains, where private sectors like Samsung and SK could play a more constructive role in leading the global market on high-tech industries like semiconductors, EV batteries and bio-chemicals.

- Third – with the Quad, the international community is once again witnessing the proof that this era is indeed characterized by ‘the rise of Asia.’ It reminds us of the Obama administration's advancement of “Pivot to Asia” as its major regional strategy, which was later termed “Rebalance towards Asia.”
- Fourth – we must take note that the Quad has ushered in an era of new type of multilateral cooperation. As NSC Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell eloquently articulated in his Foreign Affairs article last January, “the US would pursue bespoke or ad hoc bodies focused on individual problems rather than a grand coalition focused on every issue.”

Especially, the Spirit of the Quad, which was released after the virtual Quad summit two months ago, highlighted the urgency of the denuclearization of North Korea. As a candidate, president Biden promised to work with allies and others including China to advance the objective of

denuclearizing North Korea. I hope the US, China and Korea could eventually find out a new momentum to pull us out of this seemingly endless deadlock.

Transnational issues such as climate change, COVID-19 pandemic, and counter-terrorism require globally united fronts. As such, the Quad is expected to play a crucial role as an emerging platform in addressing global challenges.

I'd especially like to thank Mr. Edgard Kagan for joining us today amidst his hectic schedules. Mr. Kagan is Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania at the US National Security Council. Today we are very lucky to get firsthand information from him, who is serving as a locomotive for the implementation of the US position on the Quad.

Even though we don't have representatives from each Quad member country today, we have the best of the best specialists from the U.S. to speak on their behalf. First, we have Dr. Michael Green to speak on Japan, Australia and if possible, Russia. Next, Dr. Evan Medeiros on China's perspectives. Third, Dr. Ashley Tellis who will speak on the role of India in the Quad. Ambassador Joseph Yun will explain Southeast Asian perspective based on his invaluable experience as the US ambassador to Malaysia. On Korean side, we invited former Foreign minister Yoon Young-kwan of Seoul National University, and former Vice Minister Kim Sung-han of Korea University.

I hope they will share their personal views on the impact of the Quad on the Korean Peninsula and any possibility of Korea's joining the Quad in any format.

I thank you.

## **KEYNOTE ADDRESS**

### **Edgard KAGAN**

Thank you very, very much. And I want to thank Ambassador Park In-kook for your opening comments. I will start off by saying that I am very humbled to be here and also very intimidated because I'm joined by two of my predecessors in this position. My former boss Ambassador Yun and then Ashley Tellis who not only worked at National Security Council, but in the four years I spent in India was always the oracle for all things trying to explain what was happening in the United States to Indians and what was happening in India to Americans. So, it's a great pleasure to be here and to be joining the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies. You know, I think obviously there's been a tremendous amount of interest in the plot, but I think that it's particularly appropriate given that there are two people on the screen who were very much the initial architects of it, Ashley and Michael, who both were very much involved in the genesis. The Quad really came out of the 2004 tsunami and the ad hoc cooperation that emerged between the four countries, the United States, Japan, and Australia and India, as they did relief. Particularly cooperation amongst our militaries, because they were doing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. And I think one of the things that was surprising at the time and Ashley may want to speak to this and Michael as well, is in fact how well the four cooperate and how well the four countries, in very ad hoc basis, managed to work together to deal with some truly terrible circumstances. That led to an evolution of trying to formalize it, which took place in the 2006, 2007 time period that was driven largely by Prime Minister Abe in Japan, but which found ready ears in the other three countries. It was then after the initial meeting and some initial discussions, there was then some reluctance on the part of some of the other countries involved. And I think the Australians were amongst the ones who were the most vocal and former Prime Minister Rudd was the one who was the most explicit. But I think that it's fair to say that he was not the only one to have some misgivings about the potential reaction of others in the region to the Quad. If you fast forward to the 2017 period, I think it became very clear that there was an interest and that there was particularly strong interest on the part of the Japanese, but also amongst the others as well to resuscitate elements of this. I think that it's important to be very clear though that at no point was this envisioned to be a formal structure with a Secretariat and a lot of paperwork and rules and regulations. This was very much something that was envisioned to be greater ad hoc, informal coordination, but moving towards slightly greater structure to doing this. And so, it started off being done at the Director General, Assistant Secretary level in the foreign ministries as I was starting in 2017, and then in 2019 in September, there was the first ministerial that was done on the margins of the UN General Assembly meetings in New York. And this was a very big step and, in fact, was not easy to arrange and it's worth noting that was deliberately kept as informal as possible. Then with the pandemic and then some of the activities that were taking place along India's border, and in the region, there was a decision to do an in-person ministerial that was a standalone ministerial in Tokyo in October 2020. And that was actually in many ways, an extremely significant step because the three ministers traveled at the time of the pandemic before there was very much travel going on to do this meeting. And I think that that was acknowledged by all is very meaningful and reflecting a sense that the Quad was a vehicle for addressing shared concerns amongst four democracies that had a commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific that had a commitment to a rules-based order. And one of the things that came out of that was the establishment of a number of working groups, which would start to allow more structured follow-up on some of these issues.

When the Biden administration came to office, there was a discussion during the transition, which I was not part of it. And then at the very first days of the administration about what to do and I think there was a recognition that the Quad offered a framework for dealing with tangible issues that was very much worth following up on and expanding. And so, I think there was a very quick decision. One that I think surprised a lot of people for the reasons that Ambassador Park mentioned, which is there is, in fact, a tradition of each administration not wanting to necessarily embrace what its predecessors did. And so, the fact that the Biden administration so quickly moved to embrace the Quad, first by doing a virtual ministerial in the middle of February and then the first ever summit that actually led to a joint statement, I think that was seen correctly as a real doubling down on the Quad by the new administration. Which reflects, I think, the administration's recognition that this is a valuable framework. It offers an opportunity to address common concerns. And I think it's also worth noting that it's important to keep in mind what it's not. Which is, this is not a security alliance. It is not an Asian NATO. It is not something that has very clear governance structures. And so, it offers a very flexible framework. And I think that we tried to show that by addressing issues that are very topical and very real, including climate and the establishment of a working group on climate, also a working group on technology. And then I think what got the most attention was the vaccine announcement, which is that the US and Japan and Australia and India would work together to take advantage of India's vaccine production capacity to expand production of vaccine. I think it was very important, it's worth keeping in mind that there wasn't the time and obviously still is very much a zero-sum game of perception about vaccines. That there's a finite limited supply. And so, what we wanted to show was that we were in fact going to expand capacity so that nobody's vaccines were going to be taken to be given to somebody else. And so, this really plays to the strengths, which is India had the production capacity, the US had the vaccine and also funding, Japan had funding, and Australia has expertise in the distribution. And the idea was to expand production, to create a billion doses. And I would note that the Johnson and Johnson vaccine, which is a single dose vaccine, so it's essentially vaccinating a billion additional people by the end of 2022. Now, I know that obviously in an ideal world, we would have had a billion additional doses available in a week or month. Unfortunately, the sad reality of these things, it does take a while for these to come online. But I think what we wanted to show was that we were able to work together to achieve tangible goals. I think that the other working groups, while less dramatic in the immediate term actually also offer tremendous potential because it's very clear that climate is a common issue or common concern across the Indo-Pacific. And that the four countries of the Quad all have the ability to play a role, both in terms of their own commitments but also in terms of working with other countries to support them as they try and address climate. And that obviously technology is a critical issue for all four of the countries involved, but also for many other countries across the Indo-Pacific. I think our vision for this is that this is not a closed architecture. This is not something where there is, you know, four countries. And that's it. The idea is to have an open architecture to encourage others who have an interest in these issues to be able to participate with the idea of being able to work together to solve problems, which are real issues and real threats or real challenges across the region.

So, I think that from the administration's perspective, from the US perspective, we're very happy at the way this has gone over, both in terms of how it's been received in the region but also with the fact that we were a little nervous, frankly, that how much the different countries would really want to embrace this. Because this a change. And what we've seen is, in fact, all four of the countries involved that very much embraced the idea of operationalizing this to deal with real challenges and real problems. And it's bringing forward a very positive response within the

countries. And we've obviously received a great deal of interest from countries throughout the region and, in fact, outside the region about how there may be opportunities to participate some of these areas. I would note that we also have nine additional working groups that were created previously. We were looking to make progress on those and they cover a variety of things, including one key thing for the Quad, which if you notice in both statements as well as in unilateral statements that participants have made with us, is a recognition and a focus on ASEAN centrality. We are not trying to do anything which takes away from ASEAN centrality in the Asia Pacific or the Indo-Pacific. In fact, we're very much looking at this as something which supports ASEAN centrality and it offers opportunities to work and cooperate with us.

So, I think that from our standpoint, this is very much a work in progress. I will say that for those of us who are working on this, it is tremendously exciting. We are standing on the shoulders of giants who came before us in terms of laying out some of their ideas, but we're also getting to do something which is fairly rare in our line of work, which is helping define something that we do believe has staying power. And it has been well received and we'll offer a vehicle. We can't really imagine it all the different ways in which it may address common problems. But that we see real interest on the part of others in joining and participating in, not necessarily as expansion formally of the Quad, but in terms of some of the specific activities that it does in specific working groups. So, I think that the opportunities are definitely there. I think we all have a great opportunity to define what this is going forward. And I think that we want to make very clear that this is about countries with shared values, similar outlooks on the world, working together to address common challenges rather than something that is designed to create a formal institution which will have its own letter. So, with that, let me close by saying that I look forward to hearing from the wisdom of the others here. And I know that there's a great deal of interest about this in Korea. I was in Korea with Secretaries Blinken and Austin, and I noticed as we were going to the two plus two discussion, there were demonstrators outside saying, don't force Korea to join the Quad. So, I know that this is something that is of interest. I think that what we see is very much opportunities, opportunities to further expand areas of cooperation for countries that have common interests. We see this as something that will require discussion and we look forward to being part of that discussion moving forward. Thank you.

→ **SOHN Jie-ae:** Thank you, Mr. Kagan. I think you really laid out the evolution of the Quad as well as some of the areas in which the Quad would be operational. Before we let you go, just one thing that you mentioned that I wanted to follow up on. You mentioned the fact that it is a very open-ended kind of dialogue. And while you didn't mention the country by name, many believe that the Quad was formed as an anti-China alliance. But you talk about climate change and the issues that the Quad would be dealing with, which to be fair really cannot be dealt with efficiently without involving China. Does this mean that China also could be a part of the Quad activities in the future?

→ **Edgard KAGAN:** I think it's worth emphasizing that the Quad is very much based on the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific with a shared commitment to an open architecture, to international norms, to freedom of navigation, and obviously democracy. I mean, I think it's worth noting that all four of the countries involved are democracies and take great pride in their status in democracies and see that as part of what makes them strong in the region. So, I think that the idea that we need cooperate with other countries that there's

opportunities to work together. I think that is very clear. I think that the idea of expansion of the Quad or formalizing further membership of the Quad, that is obviously something that would need to be discussed first and foremost by the four countries involved. And then secondly, obviously there would need to be a clear benefit interest and clear participation and it's hard for me to imagine countries participating in Quad activities that didn't sign on to the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific, free of coercion, free of intimidation, free of economic retaliation or economic threats. So, you know, I don't want to sort of close off anything because who knows where the world will be evolving. But I think that for now, obviously the universal countries that share and demonstrate those values is one that is finite. And I think that's where any initial expansion or cooperation would come from.

## PRESENTATIONS

### **Michael GREEN**

Thank you very much. Thank you at Edgard. I think all your predecessors give you an A plus. Don't worry about protesters when you go to Waegyobu. There are always protesters when the NSC goes to Waegyobu. You'll know that you've made it when you go to the Foreign Ministry and the protestor has a sign with your picture and your name on it, which I enjoyed. "Michael Green. NSC. Go home." And I was very proud of that and I asked a friend of mine in JoongAng Ilbo to give me a copy of the picture and he did. But he cut off the "go home" part because he thought my family would be embarrassed. So, Korea is a robust democracy and there are always protests. And it's part of the fun. I also should clarify Ashley and I were not the architects of the Quad. Although we were there in 2004, 2005, when the tsunami hit across the Indian ocean, which prompted in very short order, in less than 24 hours, the formation of a quadrilateral task force where the US Japanese Australian and Indian Navy is to provide life saving assistance from Sri Lanka to the Andaman islands to Banda Aceh and Thailand. And it was an open architecture that provided public goods and Korea plugged in and Singapore, and eventually, even China sent some modest but symbolic mobile field hospitals to Aceh. And I think that was in a sense, the rules-based maritime partners-based architecture, but an open one for those that are willing to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific. But even then, I have to confess that Ashley and I were not the architects. We took advantage, I suppose, of our opportunity to build the common values and capabilities of the Quad. The real architects go back much further to the 1890s when Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great American strategist, argued that in the future, the Pacific would be safeguarded by the navies and the diplomacy of the US, Britain (now represented by India and Australia, I suppose), and Japan. Mahan's Quad included Germany, which was a rising power in the 1890s but was knocked out of the Pacific a few years later. But it goes even further back, when Commodore Matthew Perry returned from his expedition to open Japan in the 1850s. He gave speeches talking about how the future of the Pacific would be safeguarded by the American, the British, and perhaps the Japanese navies. But it goes back in Japan as well. In the 1860s, Sakamoto Ryoma, the great Meiji leader, proposed a maritime strategy for Japan. So, this maritime strategic tradition has very long history and is a very natural geographic and interest based and values based approach to securing stability. And the history of the Quad, Edgard just told very well. But another version of the history of the Quad, which I can say because I'm out of government, is that in Delhi, Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra, there were those who were Mahanian maritime strategists like myself and Ashley, who argued for stabilizing the region by reinforcing a cooperation among like-minded maritime democracies. And those who were continentalists, who thought, 'No, China's the rising power. The most important thing we have to do is establish a basis for strategic stability with China.' And these within the governments, there were tensions. All for governance. And I can I'll spare you all the names of who was on what side of the issue, but Ashley will remember. I mean, Japan is a very good example. Abe was in favor of the Quad. When Fukuda Yasuo replaced him, he moved away from it. John Howard was in favor of the Quad. When Kevin Rudd came in, he moved away from it. And the story is similar in India. And in the US, it's not a Republican or Democratic thing. Both parties have had pro Quad, pro maritime approaches and those who focus on China. What's interesting now is that the consensus is overwhelmingly for allies, partners, democratic values and alignment among the maritime powers in all four countries. And for that, I think we have to thank more than anyone, Xi Jinping, who created the structural conditions where those who care about a free and open Indo-Pacific have no option but to strengthen our alignment.

Second point I'd like to make quickly just to reinforce what Edgard said. There's a lot of excitement about the Quad there should be. But the Quad is one piece of a very eclectic, very complicated architecture in Asia. I would argue for example, that the trilateral US, Korea, Japan (TKOG) and trilateral defense talks are at least as important as the Quad to stability in Asia and an underperforming part of the architecture. That trilateral piece. And as Edgard said, the Quad is designed very carefully not to supplant ASEAN or ASEAN centrality. I think of the Quad as kind of a flying buttress in a medieval church in Europe where you only see the buttress from outside, but when you go inside the church, all you see are the beautiful, elegant, stained glass, windows, and arches, which is ASEAN. And it's meant to not interfere with the development within the church of what ASEAN is trying to do. ASEAN centrality and so forth. I think the point Edgard made about public goods is very, very important. In 2004 and 2005, when I was in the White House and we were responding to the Quad. By the way, for those listening who interested in government, the Quad was formed and a tsunami struck on Boxing Day, the day after Christmas. I would say, at least half the US government was not there. Maybe about 30, 40% of the NSC and State Department were there. It was the most efficient, fast, agile policy making experience I ever had in government. So, small lesson learned there. As time went on and more and more deputy secretaries and secretaries came back telling senior directors what to do (and we all know senior directors are most important), the process bogged down a bit. But the point then was the delivery of public goods. And this is an important lesson for Korean friends. What Edgard told you is really important. The emphasis on the Quad is delivery of public goods. It's reinforcing the resilience of Asia. It's moving together for Asia, not against China. But for Asia. That's a very different strategy from containment. And could the Quad become more of a security partnership? Yes, absolutely. That's possible. That's up to China. But for now, it is an open grouping that reinforces Asian stability, resilience that China could cooperate with.

And last point I'd like to make, stepping a little bit on the punchline of my Korean friends, I think Korea is a natural partner for the Quad. I personally do not see the Quad expanding. I don't think the Quad should become, or will become a Quint or a Sept. When you expand these groups, it gets slower and more cumbersome. I think it will remain the Quad for a variety of reasons. But if you look at the agenda of the Quad, maritime security. Korea has a maritime power. Development and financial infrastructure financing. Korea, KOICA are doing that. Democracy. Multiple polls show that Koreans value democracy even more than Americans. And every bit as much as Japanese and Indians. Capacity building. Korea is doing capacity building. Supply chain management. The agenda of the Quad is basically Korea's agenda in the Indo-Pacific. So, I think the question is not whether to join the Quad or not to join the Quad, you know. It's which part of the agenda on an a la carte basis will Korea join. As other countries, Canada, Britain, France joined in different aspects of the Quad. And it's not against China. It's for Asia. And what Korea is already doing for Asia is significant and makes for a very natural basis for cooperation in an ad hoc way. So, thank you all and well done Edgar. Good to see you.

## **Evan MEDEIROS**

Good morning. Good evening, everybody. Thank you for having me here today. A special thanks to President Park for inviting me. I couldn't have come up with a more timely and relevant topic than the Quad in South Korea, but of course I wasn't asked to speak directly about the Quad. I was asked to speak about a related issue, which is China and the US-China relationship. And so, it's no coincidence that regardless of the intent of the Quad and the excellent efforts by the Biden



administration and friends and allies in Canberra, Delhi, and Tokyo, the result is China sees the Quad in a particular way. And I think what's important to understand is that as the Quad evolves and, Dr. Green was exactly right, that the more that the Quad can focus on defending, supplying, extending global public goods, the greater its relevance will be, not just to Korea, but even to regional institutions that exist already, like ASEAN and beyond.

So, I think it's important to understand as the Quad evolves, and as other countries in the Asia-Pacific think about what a relationship with the Quad might be, whether it's formal or informal, whether it's as a full member, a partner, a friend—whatever nomenclature is used—the reality is that the Quad resides within an evolving dynamic. And the dynamic that I'm talking about is the US-China relationship. This is the principal headline risk to international stability today because you have two very large nuclear powers in the Asia-Pacific who are having a tough time finding a basis for the relationship. And I want to spend a minute talking about what the US-China relationship looks like today because I think it's important to understand that we have entered into what I term a “new normal” in the US-China relationship.

And that's a “new normal” defined by persistent and consistent tensions—whether the Quad was done or not is independent of these particular dynamics. These are dynamics that I believe are structural features of the relationship. In other words, this is a divergence of interests. This is a trajectory of capabilities. It's the perceptions of leaders and elites in both countries that have gotten us to this point today, you know, this “new normal” in the US-China relationship. I think there's four elements to the new normal, and this “new normal” again is the strategic backdrop to the Quad. The first element of the “new normal” is a new framework. In other words, in the United States in the Bush administration, and in the Obama administration, the prevailing logic of the US-China relationship was balancing cooperation and competition.

In other words, trying to elicit more and better cooperation from China, trying to encourage them to be less of a free rider and more of a contributor to solving regional security problems in global public goods. And then of course there was a competitive dynamic in the relationship—compete where we must and push back on issues where there's disagreement. The US-China relationship today has moved beyond cooperation and competition. It's really about competition in enmity or competition in confrontation. In other words, competition is the core dynamic at the heart of the relationship; our interests diverge more than they converge. They diverge on a wide variety of issues: economics, security, technology, and perhaps ideology. There are big debates both within China and within the United States about whether or not this competition is a systemic competition.

In other words, it is a competition of systems—models of governance—both domestic governance and international governance. And so, one of the large questions that looms over the US-China relationship today, as it has evolved to a fundamentally competitive dynamic in which competition is broad spectrum—it's intensifying, it's diversifying—is whether or not it will inevitably drift towards strategic confrontation. And so, I think one of the critical variables in understanding whether or not the relationship will drift towards strategic confrontation is whether or not there are boundaries around Chinese behavior, whether or not there are structures in the Asia-Pacific that affect the cost-benefit calculus of Chinese leaders. I think some of the ideas that we've talked about today that Edgard Kagan and Mike Green put on the table, I think are related to that issue of setting boundaries, delimiting options, shaping the choices of countries that might see their growing capability set as new and different opportunities.

So, we're in a world of a new framework. Number two: new politics. One of the reasons we're in this era of persistent and consistent tensions is in the US the politics of the US-China relationship are changing. You have both elite and popular alienation, about China polling data on this is crystal clear, there's broad bipartisan support—Republicans and Democrats, the US business community. Probably the best that you can say about them is that they're frustrated. I think it's more like alienated, and they're growing increasingly concerned by what they believe to be not just an unlevel playing field for operating in China, but the Chinese using a sort of anti-competitive and in some cases, illegal, practices. And, and lastly, because of COVID people-to-people ties are down, we see this, you know, Professor Green and I see this as professors at Georgetown—there's just a lot less connectivity between the people in our two countries.

Similarly, in China, you have new nationalist voices. You have the emergence of this phenomenon of “wolf warrior” diplomacy—Chinese diplomats who are indignant; they're confident; they're critical of other countries. Look at the recent criticism of India's handling of COVID. They've been supercharged by propaganda organs within the Chinese system, and the extreme centralization of decision-making around Xi Jinping only creates political incentives for cadres in the system to double down on this kind of approach. So, we're reaching an area in the US-China relationship where domestic politics may have as great an influence on the US-China relationship and Chinese behavior as geopolitics itself. And I think it's important to understand there are some forces at work influencing Chinese behavior that are internal and are ones that I think will only be shaped effectively through different types of external boundaries and structures.

So new framework, new politics. Point number three: new dynamics. And this is the critical one—that there are new dynamics emerging in the US-China relationship. This is a relationship, an action-reaction dynamic that bears very little resemblance to the work that myself, Dr. Green, Dr. Tellis, Ambassador Yoon experienced in our previous years, working in the White House and in the State Department. You have both countries pursuing openly confrontational strategies—and I'm not talking about openly confrontational strategies in terms of public criticism of America, Japan, Australia, or India—I'm talking about openly confrontational strategies like the precise application of economic coercion against American allies for the purposes of deterring current and future activities. So, you have both countries pursuing more confrontational strategies, especially in the case of China; you have number two, a greater tolerance for risk and friction, especially in China.

In other words, the Chinese are very actively under Xi Jinping. Very happy to tolerate a crisis in the relationship with the Philippines currently or Australia. And they're happy to accept the deterioration in public opinion because they're that confident and in some cases, indignant about what's going on. Competition between the US and China is also a new dynamic. As I mentioned, it's what I call a broad-spectrum competition. It's not just economics and security, it's in these four areas of security, economics, technology, and ideology. And one of the interesting things about this configuration of broad-spectrum competition is the lines between these four baskets are blurring. There are technology issues that have a very high-profile national security dimension—think 5G—there are national security issues that have a technology dimension, right—think about export controls.

You have issues that touch on questions of governance and ideology—look at the prevalence of subsidies in China. So, it's a configuration of broad-spectrum competition that's going to be very difficult for both sides to disaggregate. And the last point about the new dynamics is that the US and China really have not been able to put in place any kind of sustained framework for

cooperation. And I say this reluctantly, and not with any particular enthusiasm, but when you look at the main candidates for cooperation between two great powers: climate change, global health and COVID relief, global economic stability, especially the global financial system, and non-proliferation—these are all four where if I were a Martian political scientist, landing on planet earth, I would think, “Okay, of course, these are four areas where they would cooperate.”

The track record is very, very poor. And in my experience, it takes a lot of time and effort to elicit Chinese commitments. Their performance on those commitments is modest. And then they make you pay for these modest commitments, four and five times over. So, cooperation and a cooperative agenda is not the savior of the relationship. And even if we were able to get to generate substantial cooperation, it's not as if it's going to somehow magically outweigh the broad-spectrum competition that I talk about. So, the new dynamics at the heart of this relationship are here to stay. It's only going to get worse. We're really in this sort of terra incognita—this new world of longstanding great power competition. But it is, of course, a great power competition punctuated by a fairly exceptional economic interdependence, and with a rising power that has very, very serious capabilities.

I don't like the Cold War analogy. I think it obscures more than it clarifies about US-China dynamics. And one of the points I often make is that competing with China is probably going to be a lot more difficult for the United States than competing with the Soviet Union ever was. Final point: new global impacts. As the US-China competition unfolds, it's like a drop of water in a lake that's just going to ripple outward. What we're going to see is US-China tensions manifest in different geographies. So, in other words US-China tensions don't just challenge policymakers and business leaders in Asia, but increasingly in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America. So, the tensions in the relationship are going to manifest in geographies, in domains—cyber, Arctic—and even in institutions, institutions far away from the Asia-Pacific.

So, we have to understand that as the US and China struggle with how to put boundaries around their competition, how to prevent it from evolving into confrontation, especially militarized confrontation, it's going to create challenges for a whole variety of countries—not just South Korea. And, you know, most countries don't want to have to choose between the United States and China, and the Chinese know that. But the reality is that while no country wants to choose—wants to make that big consequential decision of strategic alignment—as tensions grow in the relationship countries are going to have to make choices. That's the simple reality. And the question is, do you want to make choices that are consistent with your broader foreign policy? Do you want us to make choices that have the upside benefit of contributing to global public goods?

And do you want to begin to make choices that ultimately will shape Chinese behavior in a way that is consistent with a whole variety of emerging rules, norms, and institutions—especially on those issues where the rules, norms, and institutions have not yet been set. In areas like cyberspace, or the Arctic, or autonomous vehicles. There's a whole new suite of issues, artificial intelligence, that are emerging, where rules and norms haven't been set. Of course, I'm trying to explain the context of the US-China dynamic to explain how the Quad as a flexible institution, as an institution with a broad agenda, is one that I see as only giving countries—who both directly and indirectly will be affected by US-China intentions—giving them more optionality. Because that's ultimately what most countries want in international affairs at a very basic level. They want freedom from constraints. They want security. And they want more options. And when you have an institution like the Quad, to me, the way the United States has configured it, is one of maximum optionality. So, with that, I'll turn it back over to the chair. Thank you very much.

## Ashley TELLIS

Thank you very much. It's a pleasure for me to be here with all of you this evening here, and I guess the morning in Korea. A very special thank you to Ambassador Park for inviting me to this discussion. And as I alluded, all the members on this panel are friends in some capacity or the other, and I've had the privilege of working with them over the years. So, it's a very special delight to be here. I was asked to speak today about India's attitude to the Quad. And I must say upfront that in providing this perspective, it is at best an interpretation. I cannot pretend to speak for the government of India, nor would I want to. But I've been a student of Indian foreign policy for many years, and so I approach this issue from the perspective really of an academic who has deep policy interests.

And I think it's a useful perspective to adopt because it allows me to say some things more clearly than the Indian government might feel comfortable saying. And so, I'm going to use the liberties afforded to me of not being in government service anymore to offer you some perspectives of how India thinks about this new, evolving institution in the Indo-Pacific. I think it's most productive to start by thinking about India's reception to the concept of the Indo-Pacific, because India views its engagement for the Quad in the context of a larger engagement of the Indo-Pacific construct. When the term Indo-Pacific was first articulated in rather muted form by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Indians were cautiously optimistic. They were not quite sure whether the term Indo-Pacific represented a dramatic shift in US policy, but they were alert to the possibilities that the concept afforded them. And when the Trump administration embraced the concept of the Indo-Pacific, the Indians responded more fulsomely because they saw it as an opportunity to essentially break out of the straightjacket that they believed was previously imposed on them by the previous concept—the Asia-Pacific. They saw the Asia-Pacific as essentially being inherently constrictive because it seemed to end somewhere at the Straits of Malacca. The Asia-Pacific was viewed in India as defining the great swath from Northeast Asia all the way to the Straits of Malacca. And that obviously left the Indian sub-continent out of that geography. And India always thought of itself, or wanted to think of itself, as a power in Asia that went beyond the confines of South Asia. And so, when the notion of the Indo-Pacific was articulated and embraced by the Trump administration, the Indians really saw this as an opportunity to re-engage with two hyphenations: to break the traditional hyphenation that India enjoyed with Pakistan and to strengthen the new hyphenation that India sought with China, as one of the two rising powers in Asia. So, the moment the concept of the Indo-Pacific was articulated in the United States, India saw it as an opportunity to work and operate amidst a much larger geography than the traditional geographies that essentially confined it to the Indian subcontinent. And India views its membership and activities within the Quad against this backdrop of a larger Indo-Pacific space.

Now, there's something very interesting about how India has talked about the Indo-Pacific. Prime Minister Modi made a very important speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue a few years ago, where he went out of his way to emphasize that the notion of the Indo-Pacific has to be essentially an inclusive concept. In other words, he was insinuating that a well-ordered Indo-Pacific would have enough room, even for China, as a full-fledged member of the region. And in other words, he was insinuating that there was room for China in the broader Indo-Pacific community, as long as China comported with rules-based behavior. Now, this is the formal Indian position. The formal Indian position is that the Indo-Pacific is essentially an open geography. It has room for anyone who agrees to play by the rules, but behind this formal possession, I think, is a more subtle stance. And the most subtle stance is the Indian judgment that China's assertiveness has left it outside the pale of a rules-based system.

So, in other words, the Indian approach to the Indo-Pacific is not a coalition of countries seeking to keep China out, but rather China keeping itself out of the Indo-Pacific community because of its unwillingness or inability to behave in ways that comport with common expectations in that community. So, given that the Indians have concluded that China has opted out of the Indo-Pacific community, rather than being kept out of that community, then New Delhi feels that it is completely free to become part of any other plurilateral arrangement that might emerge in order to balance against Chinese misbehavior. And so, India sees the Quad as essentially the evolution of an organic response to Chinese misbehavior, as that has been visible at least since 2008, if not earlier. They see the Quad as essentially a defense action which has emerged through completely organic means. That is, countries that have been affected by Chinese assertiveness pulling together to find ways and means and organizational expressions of combating that assertiveness.

And in that context, India is essentially agnostic about whether the Quad should expand, whether the Quad should contract—these are all second order questions from New Delhi's perspective. What is central to New Delhi's perspective about the Quad is that it is an organic response on the part of countries that care about protecting an ordered peace in Asia and are looking for ways to collaborate in preserving that ordered peace. And so that is the first important point that I wanted to leave you with this morning as I talk about Indian perspectives of the Quad. The second important point when thinking about India's attitude to the Quad is it's a view of the Quad essentially as a political activity, rather than as an institutional or a formalized security arrangement. So, it thinks of the Quad essentially as function leading form. The function of the Quad is to create if forum for discussion, for coordination, for a variety of joint activities that may judge to be in the interests of the participants. But it is not intended and it is not envisaged as a formal institution with rules, with regulations, with the secretariat, that has a calendar of activities, and so on and so forth. So, the emphasis in the Indian mind is that the Quad is a political activity which is a responsive to the demands of a particular political situation. And that political situation has been brought about in India's view by Chinese assertiveness and Chinese misbehavior. And the Quad is simply the functional expression of that collective response on the part of key Indo-Pacific nations who share one common objective. And the common objective is that they are determined to prevent the Indo-Pacific space from becoming a theatre of Chinese regional hegemony. No one is going to say it in exactly those words. No one's going to say it as transparently. But underlying all the communiqués, underlying all the conversations, is a very quiet, but resolute determination to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific space. To make certain that countries, no matter what their size or their capabilities, should not become victims to Chinese efforts to either compel them or to exact deference.

And that is the essence of the Indian approach to the Quad. So, they see it as an instrument for diplomatic coordination. They see it as an instrument for socializing the Indo-Pacific region about the dimensions of the Chinese challenge. And they see it as an evolving structure that creates room for a variety of collaborative activities on issues that matter to the participating states. And we saw after the heads of government meeting most recently, which was hosted by President Biden, that the four Quad countries have committed to working in the area of public health, in the area of climate mitigation, as well as developing new rules for advanced technologies. All of these activities are very consistent in Delhi's view with the idea of looking for opportunities to expand collaboration, and that will provide meat on what is otherwise a mechanism that could simply become a talk shop.

So, because the whole focus in New Delhi is on form following function, Delhi is very interested in making certain that the Quad actually does things rather than simply serve as a forum for having

extended conversations. The one thing that India is quite emphatic about, at least for the moment, that the Quad must not be, is that it must not be a collective defense mechanism. In other words, India does not view the Quad as a military alliance. This does not mean that the Quad countries will not engage in a variety of co-operative military activities. They might engage in exercises. They might engage in preferential forms of technology transfer. They might engage in forms of defense-industrial cooperation if it comes to it. But from an Indian point of view, the Quad is not intended to lead to military interoperability. And emphatically, not combined military operations.

In other words, what India wants the Quad to do is to serve as an instrument that balances China, but does not contain it, because the Indians are acutely aware of the fact that even as the Quad countries need to work to protect themselves against Chinese assertiveness, they're very conscious of the fact that each of the four Quad countries has varying kinds of dependencies on China. That there is an interdependence between China and each of the Quad countries that is significant. It varies, obviously, in the extent and the depth, but the fact is each of the Quad countries has important forms of economic intercourse with China, which cannot simply be walked away from. And precisely because those interdependencies are not likely to disappear any time soon, despite the political differences, the Indian state is very conscious of the fact that the strategy of containing China at the moment is not only just premature, but is also likely to fail.

And so, what they want is essentially a version that will limit China's capacity to harm their interests, but to do so through the mechanics of cooperation, rather than the mechanics of containment. And that I think is a second key point to keep in mind when one thinks about India's attitude to the Quad. The third and final point is that even though the Quad is an important component of India's own evolving strategy in the Indo-Pacific, it is not a central element in India's strategy for managing China. The central element of India's strategy for managing China is its own, internal rebuilding of its power. India is not going to give up on its strategic autonomy. India is not going to give up on its desire to build its own national capabilities. And India looks at all the international instruments that are within reach, whether it's the Quad, or whether it's the various bilateral relationships that it enjoys with other foreign capitals, as being instruments that are best used to build Indian power, because New Delhi believes that the best antidote to Chinese misbehavior is a strong and capable India.

And so, the Quad is simply one more arrow in the Indian quiver. There are a variety of instruments that India will put a premium on. In fact, even more important than the Quad, from an Indian perspective, is the quality of its bilateral relationships. And in Asia, there are three or four critical bilateral relationships that matter to India in the context of its competition to China. The first, of course, and in many ways, *sui generis*, is India's relationship with the United States. It really has no parallels because India sees the United States as simply a global power that transcends all geographies and is truly the only country in the world with comprehensive capabilities. And so, in many ways, for any Indian success, a strong relationship with the United States is a *sine qua non*. But when it looks beyond the United States, India sees the imperative of having a tight relationship with Japan as being among its first order preferences in Asia. Developing the relationship with the Republic of Korea, developing a strong relationship with Singapore, and for reasons that have as much to do with China as it has to do with India's own history, maintaining a strong relationship with Vietnam is very important for India's balancing strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

Very interestingly, as Sino-Indian relations become more and more strained because of the difficulties on the border, India is now tantalizingly entertaining the idea of even stronger relations with Taiwan, and it would not be surprising to see in years to come the Indian relationship with

Taiwan being far more transparent and far more supportive than it has been in the last 30 or 40 years. And when one looks beyond Asia, India sees a critical priority placed on its relationship with Russia, which goes back to the days of the Cold War. A very important relationship with the European Union because India has very strong economic links that key European states—Great Britain, France, and Germany being among the most important—and increasingly an Indian relationship with Israel. All of this is by way of making a simple point; that while India will continue to work within the Quad and strengthen the Quad to the degree that strengthening is required, India does not see the Quad as a substitute for key bilateral relationships that it enjoys with different capitals around the world.

And those bilateral relationships are all oriented towards building India's capacity and building India's power. So, when one looks at India and the Quad from a distance, I think the key point to keep in mind is the point that Edgard Kagan made at the beginning of this meeting, which is India sees the Quad as part of a flexible, evolving architecture in Asia. It's one more plurilateral. India wants to gain the benefits of being present in this plurilateral because it shares values with its other three partners. It shares core strategic interests with these other three partners. And it believes that there are sufficient complementarities of capability and interest to make this a worthwhile plurilateral. But even as it does that, it does not think of the Quad as the be all or end all of India's strategic response to China. And so, these are very important considerations to keep in mind when one thinks about India and the evolving environment in the Indo-Pacific. Thank you.

## **Joseph YUN**

Well, many thanks to our moderator Sohn Jie-ae, of course, and thank you to ambassador Park for bringing us together. It's great to see my colleagues, former colleagues and friends in Korea, and I wanted to discuss, continue the theme that Ashley and Evan laid out, that is, you know, not just the quad, but what China is and what U.S. is. And within this Southeast Asian region, which of course has been very much a multi-polar part of the globe for centuries as Michael Green pointed out, really home to great power rivalry. And now it is the center, I would say, of the US-China competition. In a good way to see how well Beijing is doing, how well Washington is doing, is to see where the needle is shifting. I wanted to talk to you about a small interface, a story when Edgard and I worked in Kuala Lumpur several years ago. I think it was my last year in Kuala Lumpur, the new Chinese ambassador came and there was a massive reception for him in a huge hotel and much bigger than the reception I got two years beforehand and you could see the ministers and really all the Malaysian, Chinese big money men coming in. It almost reminded me of some kind of Imperial envoy being received. That's when I really did recognize that the needle has moved quite substantially, certainly over my own career, of three decades in, in foreign service towards Beijing. That is not to say that we've not had a bit of countermoves now and then. One of them was during when Mike and Ashley were in the white house, George W. Bush era with the global war on terror. I would say that certainly when the needle moved a little bit in countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, and other countries, where, who are genuinely concerned about terrorism. Another one was when Evan was in the Obama team. And we really had lot of diplomacy at that time. I'm sure you'll remember. We joined the East Asia summit. We signed the TPP agreement and, you know, Obama would invariably come to the region. And in when I was in Malaysia alone, he came twice to Malaysia and showing up does make a huge difference in Southeast Asia. I would say there was a terrific amount of goodwill for what I would call Obama's soft diplomacy and that worked well. But I do think one downside of the Obama administration in Southeast Asia was his

failure to push back against the Chinese claims in South China sea. Over those eight years, a significant amount of dredging took place, fortification of some rocks that were not even on the maps, to building up ports, even public schools, charter flights coming in from mainland to these features, these maritime features. And I think towards the end, China declared this region to be administrative regions of China. And some of that was pushed back on the Trump administration. There was much more aggressive US Navy presence with freedom of navigation operations, and some increase in military assistance to places like Philippines. But I do think on the four years of Trump, real diplomacy real American diplomacy in Southeast Asia suffered. And, you know, if you recall on day one of the Trump administration, the United States pulled out of TPP and, there was no one really going to East Asia summit meetings and ASEAN was pretty much down on that. And the U.S. was notably absent during the Rohingya tribulations when so many of them, I think literally almost a half a million or more were kicked out of Rakhine state into neighboring Bangladesh and elsewhere. So really, I think we've had ups and downs, but the needle is certainly going towards Beijing's way.

But the region recognizes, I think there is an opportunity for Biden team because the region is anxious. There are growing worries that China is getting very big. Chinese size, economic weight, and what Evan mentioned, the aggressive policies of Xi Jinping. They have all gotten, ASEANs worried. And really, as Ashley mentioned it so well, there is no one else, but the US to redress that balance in the region. I think that is an accepted fact. And they are looking to the United States to quietly redress some of them. Some countries are more welcoming than others, but in general, even the smallest countries like Laos and Cambodia are worried about Chinese presence. And so beyond working with quad, I think Quad will be important, but I'm not sure that the region, the Southeast Asian region wants to see an entity called the Quad. They are worried, I think like both Mike and Edgard mentioned, that could this replace ASEAN centrality.

And so, I think they do believe that they should not be another formal organization. So if they weren't the here, what Ashley and Mike and all of you saying that it's an open structure, not a formal structure, they would certainly be reassured. And really five points, very simple, I'll quickly put them down on what I do believe Biden administration should do to further US influence and bring that needle a little bit more towards Washington within Southeast Asia.

The first is that US should work with ASEANx. I think it's very important to work with ASEAN, and it's not, you know, most commonly in the United States, you know, we think of it as a talk shop. It is more than a talk shop. It is a real regional organization with real influence. I mean, if you're looking for ASEAN to problem solving, that's not going to happen. It is more about trust building and they have displayed that, throughout decades. Most recently they have brought the Thai and Cambodian side together with the border issue, before that Malaysia and Philippines over Salba issue. And so, they can play a role. And of course, therefore from East Asia Summit to ASEAN regional forum, they can play a role.

My second point is that soft power is not enough. US needs to spend more money, but more than that, we need to exercise hard power as well. And this is the military side of the Trump's free and open Indo-Pacific. And this to be needs to be more refined and developed further. I think we need to see much more regular foreign ops, more ship visits, some joint exercise, but not within the Quad context. We can pick and choose the partners we can do it with, whether Australia, Great Britain, Malaysia, we used to have the three countries, Australia, Malaysia, and US, do military exercise.



My third point is beyond the South China sea. There is another body of water, which is very important, especially to the mainland Southeast Asia, and that is of course the Mekong river. China has really done a number of dams building up the river and downstream countries have very much suffered as a result. We used to have an initiative called Lower Mekong Initiative that needs to be, I do believe we need to be rebuilt and put out there and working with countries in the region, as well as Japan and others, I think that could be strengthened. And that would especially bring in very small countries that are pretty much, much more on Beijing's side. Those are Laos and Cambodia.

The fourth point I want to make is that the US must forward more of a vision on economic prosperity. To me, that has been a weak point after we pulled out of TPP. And obviously another big trade agreement is not probably in the works, but we have to forward that vision. There is no question that the region wants to see more American economic presence. They really do not want to depend more on China on this. They want to see more American foreign investment, and they want to see more American goods and services, and they in turn want to be able to export more to the United States. That's a very important point.

The last point is, I also do believe like the economic vision, the region is also open to American values. Human rights, democracy, rule of law are very important concepts, especially among the people of Southeast Asian countries. Of course, when the government, of Southeast Asian countries come under criticism, we're likely to get pushback, but even then, what we say about Myanmar and what we say about Thailand, these things matter, and they are taken seriously by ASEAN and by those groupings. So, I do believe these values still remain very much American strategic interests there.

So, let me just end there, but if I can have a word on Korea since this is about Korea, too, Korea is caught in a tough place. Certainly, if Quad remains within the domain of public good, there will be no question that I believe they will join working groups on say, you know, on vaccines to climate and technology, but there will be resistance to anything resembling of formal structure that is essentially countering China. I think that will be quite difficult for the Biden administration to sell to South Korea. Well, thank you very much. I look forward to listening to comments from our Korean panelists and questions as well. Thank you.

## **DISCUSSION**

### **YOON Young-kwan**

Okay. Thank you very much, professor Sohn for your introduction. And it is my great pleasure and privilege to participate in this important conference. And thank you for inviting me, ambassador Park In-kook. I learned a lot from the previous speaker's speeches, and they were very much enlightening me and also encouraging in the sense that I will explain. I had the chance to read the joint statement of Quad leaders announced after the virtual meeting in March 12th. And I found it very interesting to see that there were no words such as China or military included in that statement, the word security only appeared just three or four in the statement composed of some 700 words. So I could recognize that some important change occurred in the approach to Quad. And I think that was very important. My understanding was that the Quad until the end of the Trump administration was mainly regarded as an institution to counter China militarily in coalition with other democracies. However, president Biden seemed to have plans to revive the Quad as an organization, or as a framework for meeting international challenges in the world.

Even though countering China militarily may remain as one important agenda of the Quad, I think the impression that I got from reading the joint statement of Quad leaders was that those four members states of the Quad are planning to provide international public goods. Mr. Kagan's speech was very encouraging and I think many Koreans would probably welcome his speech, which even mentioned that Quad is not a security institution and the US does not intend to make it a kind of Asian NATO. So I think it's an important change, a significant change. So far there was no multi-lateral, I mean, international institutions in this region, other than ASEAN that aims to provide international public goods. Furthermore, the Quad leader's summit provided specific, tangible work plans. For example, the quad summit factsheet announced that there would be three working groups: one focused on COVID 19, the other focused on climate change, and the last one would be focused on helping the countries in the Indo-Pacific on critical technologies. I think this kind of change in the nature and the mission of the Quad would be welcomed by the people and political leaders in this region. Political leaders of many countries in this region, as we all know, have been sharing a common dilemma of having to choose between the United States and China at the time of ever intensifying competition. On the one hand, many countries have cross security ties with the United States, while maintaining a deep economic relationship with China. So this kind of widened mission and agenda of the quad will change those political leaders' costs and benefit calculation regarding joining the quad. Probably they will feel less burdensome when they consider seriously joining the quad and South Korea is no exception. The top South Korean political leaders might have fared very burdensome on joining the quad up to now as many other Indo-Pacific countries or South Korea has a deep economic relationship with China. And China has already flexed its muscles against South Korea when South Korean government said yes to USFK's decision to deploy THAAD in 2016. In addition to this dilemma, South Korea, as we all know, has the North Korea question, including disarmament of North Korea's nuclear capabilities. This is a unique, additional burden only for South Korea, because South Korea needs China's support and help when it tries to resolve this nuclear problem and try to build a peace on the Korean peninsula. And the change in the mission and agenda of the quad will make South Korean policymakers feel less burdensome in making a decision on joining the quad. It is because if it does not join the quad, South Korea may lose the important opportunities to make progress in many important issue areas like COVID-19, critical technologies, climate change, supply chain, cyberspace, infrastructure

building, etc. My friend Michael Green has already mentioned and I agree with him that South Korea can be a partner to the quad, especially upgrading South Korea's key high technologies through international cooperation or working together with quad members in the field of cyberspace or climate change which will be an important process to South Korea. Furthermore, trying to find the solution of the North Korean nuclear issue and discussing on how to build a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula together with quad members or to help South Korea's efforts to mobilize international support for South Korea's North Korea policy,

Considering all this, as a private citizen of South Korea, I recommend the Korean government to consider a seriously joining the quad, beginning from entering the working groups first.

However, I have two caveats. First, before South Korea is making decision to join the quad both the US and South Korean government leaders should discuss on how to respond to possible Chinese retaliation on South Korea for South Korea joining the quad. China has been sending a clear message to South Korea that South Korea had better not join the quad in various ways. There is a high possibility that China would retaliate against South Korea as it did at the time of decision to deploy THAAD in Korea. China's economic sanctions on South Korea at the time of THAAD deployment, South Korean people mostly felt helpless and the US did not do much to help South Korea. And I think this time it should be different. The second caveat is about South Korea's unique geopolitical dilemma as a divided country. South Korean presidents, either liberal or conservative, all of them tried, to establish some kind of, permanent peace on the Korean peninsula, even a conservative president, president Park Geun-hye tried hard to maintain a good relationship with China because she believed that South Korea will need China's help when South Korea wanted to solve the nuclear problem and try to build a permanent peace in Korea. So, I think South Korea needs deep understanding and closer cooperation from especially the United States and Japan.

### **Sohn Jie-ae**

Thank you very much. Thank you, professor Yoon, professor Kim, would you like to add on, or would you like to wait for a round after the round of responses,

### **KIM Sung-han**

First of all, I'd like to thank Ambassador Park for giving me this wonderful opportunity to speak to our distinguished speakers online as well as offline.

As all of you have already pointed out, Quad is an informal strategic dialogue among those four countries. Until now, it has been coping with a variety of issues, including pandemic, climate change, and others, including economic cooperation with the aim of establishing free and open Indo-Pacific. I think this is an excellent vision as well as an excellent framework.

But still, it is lacking in kind of a clear identity as compared with BRI of China – Belt and Road Initiative. You know, BRI is clearly aiming at kind of global infrastructure, kind of development cooperation. So, that is why this kind of evolving dynamic on the part of the Quad is producing a lot of speculation about the end state of Quad.

Right away, as long as Quad is neither international organization nor multinational alliance, there is a little reason for the ROK to join it. By the way, the Moon government has been saying that ROK has not been invited officially to join Quad. And that is why it has shown somewhat a lukewarm attitude by saying that Quad is not an inclusive mechanism; it is supposed to be

developing towards inclusive mechanism. So, this kind of things has been said by the ROK government. So, in this sense, I think that the ROK government has already lost the opportunity to join Quad as an official member. Rather, good news is that the ROK government – the Moon government – appears to be interested in joining, participating in a variety of working groups – somewhat less sensitive kind of issue areas. I think that that is good news. That is much better than, not joining Quad as a full member because that could be interpreted as taking somewhat gradualist approach toward Quad.

You know, if you read the Korean media reporting, they have been saying that so-called Quad Plus, which appears to be interpreted as kind of a partial participation, not full participation in Quad, maybe participating in working groups of Quad could be seen like that way. But I think Quad Plus could be somewhat different from participating in working groups. So, I'm still wondering if any of our American speakers are very much interested in making some countries like ROK, Vietnam, and New Zealand as kind of Plus members, not full members, who have less obligations and less kind of rights for the Quad.

Lastly, what is the end state of Quad? All of our American speakers have mentioned “evolving dynamic.” That means you are not quite clear about the end state of Quad. So, that's why many Korean media, as well as other countries' medias, have been mentioning the Asian version of NATO, or at least they are saying Quad is supposed to be moving towards the stage in which the member states or participating countries, forum members can talk to each other to make this forum more strategic, so that, for example, China may not impose a so-called coercive diplomacy against U.S. allies and partners. Minister Yun already pointed out so-called the ‘South Korean THAAD trauma’ when the United States did a little to help us out. So, many Korean people are saying that this kind of gathering even if it is [inaudible], it is supposed to develop toward a kind of a mechanism to prevent China from imposing such kind of coercive diplomacy. So, I think that is going to be our common kind of task or homework to continue to discuss with. Thank you.

### **SOHN Jie-ae**

Thank you, Professor Kim. You both have raised very interesting perspectives. I think Professor Yoon wanted to add something to his comments previously.

### **YOON Young-kwan**

Yes. I forgot to mention this. I think the quad members, especially the US policy makers have an important homework. That is there is a wide gap between policymakers' intention on the side of quad members. Regarding quad as non-security institution, non-Asian NATO and general public perception outside quad in the Indo-Pacific. They usually think that quad is mainly a kind of security mechanism countering China, and there is a huge gap between these two. How to narrow that kind of gap as soon as possible will remain as an important agenda. Thank you.

### **SOHN Jie-ae**

Thank you, Professor Yoon. I think as I turn it over to our panel of speakers, I think the questions can be sort of maybe grouped into two areas. One sort of the questions that arise from the dilemma of Korea and countries like Korea that are sort of stuck between the U.S.-China dynamics. As Dr. Medeiros talked about before, the geopolitical dilemma, especially when South Korea has to deal

with North Korea and China, definitely has to be a player in the resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. There were also some questions raised about the end state of the Quad. I mean, you talked about it developing – still in the process of development – but, what do you see as the end state of the Quad? There have been some concerns about Quad in dealing with all sorts of issues and therefore, is there a hype around the Quad? Would they be able to deliver? And a lot of the concerns, especially from public – public perspective about Quad being viewed as an anti-China alliance. Again, it goes back to the dilemma that countries like Korea feel within these geopolitical issues. I think it sort of pertains to all four of your talks, but whichever one would like to go first, you have the mic.

### **Evan MEDEIROS**

So, this is Evan. Why don't I go first? Yes. Great. Thanks to both of our Korean speakers for wonderful presentations. It helped me better understand the nature of South Korean thinking. And I want to make two very brief points about the China dimension of this equation. The first one is, who is the country in Asia, or which country in Asia is the biggest proponent of this idea that the Quad is a sort of NATO of Asia, quasi military alliance. Anybody? It's China. The Chinese love this narrative because it's exactly this kind of narrative they know by promoting it that undercuts regional support for the Quad. I can remember when I was in the Obama White House and we launched the Asia Pacific Pivot strategy, and immediately the very first narrative that developed that we subsequently tracked all the way back to Beijing was simply the narrative that the Pivot is all about the military. This is about America trying to re-establish, reclaim its losing military hegemony, right? And of course, this narrative was an attack from the reality that the Pivot initiative was launched when America was hosting APEC in Hawaii. And the centerpiece of it was a revitalized TPP, that we were going to put TPP (Transpacific Partnership) at the center of it. So, my point is, the Chinese are acutely aware of how regional policymakers, allies, and non-allies, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, how they think and debate about these issues. And they actively participate in that dialogue to create an environment where countries and policymakers are not encouraged to join these institutions. So, that's point number one. Point number two – if there's any lesson that I've learned from both my study of Chinese behavior and of course my time as a practitioner, it's this one. If you give in the Chinese pressure, it results in only one thing, more Chinese pressure, right? And that is just simply a truism. And it may be more true today than ever before, because the Chinese are both, in terms of intentionality and capability, feeling very robust on both fronts. And the fact that the confidence is now sort of peppered with a sense of indignation about America, its allies, and partners [inaudible], you know, Chinese behavior or particular edge to it. So, if countries start shying away from the Quad because they fear Chinese retaliation, then that is precisely what China wants you to do. And I worry a little bit about South Korea, because when I think about the countries that China is most interested in deterring from joining collective efforts, it's American allies in East Asia because the Chinese strategy is if you can pick off the big fish and prevent them from joining, then why would ASEAN ever – you know, ASEAN countries, for example – why would ASEAN countries ever consider taking a similar initiative?

And, to be very Frank, I think the Chinese already have misinterpreted the Chinese response to the THAAD episode and the THAAD drama, believing that their coercion was able to shape South Korea's response. And I would hate to see that sort of narratives become consolidated in Beijing because it would put a lot of downward pressure on South Korea's freedom of action and South Korea's ability to work within the China-South Korea relationship, for example, to make progress

on North Korea. While I am very attentive to, and fully appreciate the anxiety and concern about Chinese retaliation, remember this game has multiple different phases to it, and the Chinese are very acutely aware of that. So with that, why don't I stop here and turn it go to you, Madam chair. Thank you.

### **SOHN Jie-ae**

Yes. Thank you. I think one of the things that we remember is that the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi coming out very strongly saying that the Quad was a testament of the Cold War framework from the United States. So, they are pushing that narrative very strongly. Dr. Tellis, would you like to also add in, along with Dr. Green after you.

### **Ashley TELLIS**

Certainly. Thank you so very much. I want to address two issues that came up in the talks that are offered by our Korean participants. The first is the search for an end state. I think that is a misleading way to think about the Quad, because there is no in-state. The Quad's activities, its current state is the end state. The Quad will evolve as circumstances push it to evolve. But I don't think the four partners have some vision that they are working towards in terms of institutionalization. They're completely comfortable with the idea that this will be a perpetual activity whose focus will shift depending on what the challenges of the moment are. It does not preclude any of the partners from cooperating with other states, either as a quadrilateral or bilaterally. And so, this is really part of the wider spaghetti bowl of Asian collaborations that transcend any particular form. And so, I would just caution against looking for an end state.

I think the partners are very comfortable with where they are now and if the squad has to evolve into something else, they will make the appropriate decisions about its evolution when that time comes. But I think it's dangerous to somehow think of the Quad as a quasi-club, [inaudible] and talk about membership and from thence draw the inference that they can be things like Quad Plus. I mean, there is absolutely no reason why South Korea cannot cooperate with the Quad members without ever using the label Quad or cooperate with any subset of the Quad members, if it thinks that is in its interest. In fact, in my mind, that is the way you skin the scat, the way you avoid getting into more confrontational postures with China while still maintaining open relationships with all of the Asian states is to simply deal with them as opportunities allow and avoid getting boxed into particular institutional expressions.

And so, from a point of view of Korean self-interest, if I were in Seoul, I would say work with the four partners without ever using a label; work with any subset of the four partners as it serves your interests and avoid seeking to become part of a group that is literally not a group. You know, it is an idiosyncratic coming-together of countries that have shared activities for a certain political end and are not looking for institutional representation or institutional longevity. And so as long as we keep that in mind, I think we can, you know, this problem becomes far less complicated than it may sometimes see.

### **Michael GREEN**

And I understand and appreciate and think Americans need to – all the Quad members need to – understand and appreciate Korea's unique geopolitical situation and the division of the Peninsula

and the North Korea conundrum and the importance of China in that. I will say very bluntly that I often feel like my friends in Korea are the only U.S. allies in Asia, perhaps in the world that is still fixated on a bipolar U.S.-China competition without recognizing how much this is a multipolar dynamic. And that, I think, is perhaps limiting analysis of the costs and opportunities of cooperating. In the coming two years, I feel very confident predicting that the Quad will not expand membership. I think Evan and Ashley would agree. It will remain a quad and that at least half a dozen countries, democracies and allies of the United States from Canada to the Netherlands and Britain will cooperate with the Quad in one way or another.

If in that timeframe, the South Korean government is so worried about China's reaction, so traumatized by THAAD that Korea does nothing to cooperate, even in a somewhat modest way with some aspect of the Quad – I worry two things will happen. One – Beijing, to Evan's point, will conclude that when it has its next demand of South Korea and that next demand might be in the process of unification, it might be the question of whether or not U.S. forces remain in Korea, whether or not there's a U.S.-Korea alliance. The Chinese will read into this scenario optimism to Evan's point that they can demand and expect Korea will expel U.S. forces and the alliance. It increases Beijing's expectation that when they need something big geopolitically from Seoul to obstruct the U.S.-Korea Alliance, they're going to get it. That's one problem.

The second problem is Korea is self-isolating right now, and it worries me as a friend of Korea and committed support of the alliance. If you look at the network of relationships in many, many fields – technology, security, development – that's just expanding among the U.S., India, Australia, Indonesia. Korea is not in most of them. I can't share screen, but my colleague Victor Cha has a map showing all the connectivity within, among democracies in Asia and the least connected democracy, other than, you know, smaller countries, the least connected major democracy is Korea. So, too bipolar, too much U.S.-China. I think Korea is missing an opportunity to expand its options, strengthen its statecraft by playing a much more dynamic multipolar arrangement using the Quad, but not just the Quad, using other arrangements, working with Australia. It's a lost opportunity for Korea and it's a signal to Beijing. That's not going to be helpful down the road. I worry. Sorry for being so blunt, but it's late evening for us. So, I'm less diplomatic.

### **SOHN Jie-ae**

We're benefiting from that, Dr. Green. Ambassador Yun, would you like to maybe have the last word in terms of speaking about Korea's position versus the Quad?

### **Joseph YUN**

Thank you very much. It's just two points I want to make. Which is number one, among U.S. policymakers, Korean position is very, very well understood. And, I think, it is completely understood and they're showing signs of it. As you mentioned, nobody has invited Korea, you know, to join the Quad. And there is no plan as Ashley made it clear that this is some kind of engraved invitation with Quad on top that's going to go out. That's just not going to happen. And so, but I do like the idea that Korea as a U.S. ally with 29,000 U.S. troops there, this is not about choosing between U.S. and China. Korea has made that choice already. Otherwise, why would 29 - 28,000 U.S. troops be there? And so, I think, Koreans should look at it more broadly seeing it as an opportunity, and there could be plenty of other benefits. For example, this may be the way to

improve relations, bilateral relations with Japan, for example, you know, and so I think there are positive aspects to it.

And so I don't think there will be the suffering and retaliation. There is a bit of a doomsday scenario, I believe, if you begin cooperation, as you say, and working level on global issues like climate, and that makes sense. So on. So again, I like Ashley's point, this is not a huge burden, you know, and to be honest with you, I think India is in a similar place as many of the Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam. So, let's not get overly excited, so they don't have signs saying no to Quad. I think that's kind of going pretty much the other way. Thank you very much.

### **SOHN Jie-ae**

Thank you. I want to give an opportunity once more to our Korean participants. If you'd like to maybe add a question, I know you're all dying, you're all reaching for your mics. Professor Yoon, you reached for it first.

### **YOON Young-kwan**

Thank you very much. I think all of you made a very important and relevant points. I think policymakers and Korean people had better pay attention to what you have said. And as Mike mentioned, U.S.-China competition, G2 for example, are the most popular words appearing in Korean news media. And I have been trying to proceed not to use the term G2 whenever I have some opportunities in my column or something like that. But I think that's a relevant point and, the Biden administration – their policy is quite different from Trump administration's foreign policy, emphasizing the importance of democracy, alliance, multilateralism, etc. And South Korea's constitution – I mean, define South Korea. South Korea is our state identity as a democracy and South Korea is alliance of the United States. So, I think it is time for South Korean government to make some change in terms of foreign policy regarding alliance or our North Korea policy. And I guess our government will probably go toward that direction. Thank you.

### **KIM Sung-han**

Okay. Two points. So one is that, I'm really glad that Quad has no end state – what Quad is doing is the end state. Ashley Tellis told us that point. I think that that point is very important point from the strategic viewpoint, because many countries including the ROK are concerned about the end state, kind of a final destination. But sometimes we need to be creative enough to move ahead with a lot of options for the future. So, that is what you have called kind of evolving dynamic. That is more strategic than trying to be fixated on a very crystal clear vision of our forum. Secondly, as I mentioned, Korea, the ROK government, has lost the opportunity to become a full-fledged member of Quad because they have been obsessed with kind of bipolar mentality as Mike Green has pointed out. So, Korea has two options for now. Taking kind of a gradualist approach towards joining working groups as soon as possible, and then explore future opportunities to join Quad as a full-fledged member when the window of opportunity has been somewhat widened.

The second option – you just continue to focus on inter-Korean relations, just ignore the other strategic issues, just stop thinking about joining even working groups of Quad. I think the first one, it would be a much better than the second one for now. Thank you. ###